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This Article concerns the sway of intellectual property law over scientists 
and their institutions.  Patent monopolies encourage scientists and innovators 
to invent, but we rarely ask “as opposed to doing what?”  I argue that the 
“what” is, at least some of the time, “basic” (nonpatentable) scientific research 
and discovery.  This Article questions the viability of the discovery/invention 
distinction in patent law and considers the consequences that it has long had 
on the scientific enterprise.
This Article has four aims:  (1) to re-engage a once-vibrant conversation 
about what, if any, property rights should inhere to “basic” scientific research 
products at the margins of existing categories of intellectual property law; (2) to 
contrast patent law’s consequential and idiosyncratic characterizations of “ba-
sic” and “applied” science with those of other disciplines; (3) to highlight the 
distortions that patents foist upon the scientific enterprise by attaching monopo-
lies to some research products but not others—affecting the distribution of scien-
tific talent, the focus of research, the investment priorities of public and private 
actors, and so on; and (4) to reconsider the government’s approach to basic-
research funding.  A view of patents as a legal construct layered upon science, 
In its Symposium Scholar Essay Competition, the Law Review solicited entries 
from law school students and recent graduates on the topic of intellectual property 
reform.  The following piece was selected as the winner. 
† J.D., Stanford Law School, 2007; M.Sc. (Biology), Oxford University, 2004; B.A. 
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2176 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 2175
rather than a default extracted from science, alters the political and legal status 
of “basic research” and “discovery.”  In this view, public funding of basic 
(nonpatentable) research becomes as much a matter of mitigating market distor-
tions and treating likes alike as of promoting civic largesse or economic growth.  
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INTRODUCTION
Science discerns the laws of nature.  Industry applies them to the needs 
of man. 
Rotunda, The Museum of Science and Industry, Chicago 
Chicago’s Museum of Science and Industry embodies America’s 
heroic vision of science.  Its space shuttle, U2 submarine, house-sized 
heart, and coal mine with a doomed animatronic canary are grand in 
scale and rich in meaning.  The museum’s exhibits depict triumphs of 
the highest virtues of our scientific history and technological present:  
equanimity, collaboration, and reverence for nature.  Gazing into that 
rotunda as a child, one’s choice comes down to a career of revelation 
or one of committed humanism; the drudgery of gel electrophoresis is 
only revealed years later. 
The delineation between decrypting nature and fashioning it to 
meet needs is deeply rooted.  Perhaps that is due to slogans filling 
museum rotundas; perhaps it is because our intellectual property re-
gime partitions research along such lines.  Either way, it is an imper-
fect intuition.  Science and industry are tightly bound.1  Industry mas-
sively invests in basic research.2  Tenured researchers and government 
scientists spend much of their time, and generate much of their liveli-
hood, attending to commercial interests.3  Even the quasi mystics of 
1 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotech-
nology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 195 (1987) (“In [biotechnology], the traditional divid-
ing line between basic and applied research is blurred.  Not only has the historical 
time lag between the two collapsed, but it has become difficult to characterize given 
research problems as belonging in one category or the other.”). 
2 Industry spending has far surpassed that of the federal government in the last 
quarter century, becoming the primary source of research and development (R&D) 
investment in the United States.  As of “FY 2000, private sector R&D was 67% of total 
U.S. R&D, federal funding a mere 30%.  This compares to an even split in 1976 be-
tween these two sources of R&D funding and a higher federal R&D budget compared 
to that of industry in the years prior to 1975.”  PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON 
SCI. & TECH., EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ASSESSING THE U.S. R&D INVEST-
MENT: FINDINGS AND PROPOSED ACTIONS 4 (2002) (footnote omitted) (citing ELISA 
EISEMAN ET AL., RAND SCI. & TECH. POL’Y INST., FEDERAL INVESTMENT IN R&D 15 fig.2-1 
(2002)), available at http://www.ostp.gov/pdf/final_rd_report_with_letters.pdf. 
3 Indeed, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) recently imposed limits on its 
sponsored scientists’ consulting engagements and private investments in order to pre-
serve “the trust of the public.”  Jeffrey L. Fox, Biotech Consulting, Investing by NIH Scien-
tists Curbed, 23 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 274, 274 box 1 (2005) (quoting NIH director 
Elias Zerhouni).  See generally Posting of Stephen Quake to The Wild Side, 
http://judson.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/17/the-absurdly-artificial-divide-between-
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scientific history—the alchemists and string theorists—did science for 
the sake of very concrete, human goals.4
Science and industry, discovery and invention—these categories 
are not of science.  They were not, at some critical moment, plucked 
from Platonic ether.  They are deeply human and partial categories 
that reflect particular accounts of what we think we do when we do 
science, a legal system that relentlessly parses endeavors, and the con-
tours of our political economy.  The reality of science is far messier 
and far less categorical.  The lines between research and application, 
between man’s place in nature and study of nature, have ever defied 
glib summary.  Entire disciplines study the sociology, history, and phi-
losophy of science.5  How we think and write about science is a flash-
point because of what it may signal about weighty topics like truth and 
certainty.6  Most of these discussions take the form of academic ab-
straction, drawing popular attention only with high-profile Sokal 
Hoaxes or intermittent storms over the difference between scientific 
theory (say, regarding the descent of man through time) and scien-
tific fact.7
Given the relative obscurity and frequent absurdity of such spats, it 
is easy to lose sight of the law’s deeply consequential—and equally 
idiosyncratic—account of science.  Law defines the epistemic content 
of evidence, as well as the legal, political, and even scientific status of 
entire forensic disciplines.8  It delineates where empirics end and faith 
pure-and-applied-research/ (Feb. 17, 2009) (noting many examples of scientists mov-
ing between pure and applied research). 
4 See generally LYNDY ABRAHAM, MARVELL AND ALCHEMY (1990); LEE SMOLIN, THE 
TROUBLE WITH PHYSICS: THE RISE OF STRING THEORY, THE FALL OF A SCIENCE, AND 
WHAT COMES NEXT (2006). 
5 For an overview of the disciplines that study science in its many forms, see gen-
erally WALTER LIBBY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE (1917); STEWART 
RICHARDS, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE (1984). 
6 For a discussion of the so-called “science wars” that erupted after the Sokal 
Hoax, see infra note 83. 
7 We are all familiar with debates in public education over the status of allegedly 
“competing” theories of creationism (and its mildly sanitized alter-ego, intelligent de-
sign) and evolutionary biology.  A classic, Pulitzer Prize–winning text on the subject is 
EDWARD LARSON, SUMMER FOR THE GODS: THE SCOPES TRIAL AND AMERICA’S CONTINU-
ING DEBATE OVER SCIENCE AND RELIGION (1997).  See also BARBARA FORREST & PAUL R.
GROSS, CREATIONISM’S TROJAN HORSE: THE WEDGE OF INTELLIGENT DESIGN (2004). 
8 A notable example from forensic odontology is the young and amorphous disci-
pline of “bitemark evidence.”  Despite repeated studies reporting alarmingly high er-
ror rates, practitioners largely support the field’s empirical legitimacy and practical 
application. See, e.g., I.A. Pretty, A Web-Based Survey of Odontologist’s Opinions Concerning 
Bitemark Analyses, 48 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1117 (2003) (finding support for the continued 
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begins in classrooms.  It also frames the incentives attached to certain 
forms of research.9  In each of these contexts, as law characterizes how 
science is done, it also shapes how science is done.  These interac-
tions—particularly those arising from doctrines of patentable subject 
matter—are the subject of this Article. 
Some have criticized law’s approach to science for relying on ar-
chaic and even romantic conceptions of what science is and what it 
does.  For instance, critics have assailed Daubert’s standard for the ad-
missibility of scientific evidence10 as an anachronistic hodgepodge of 
irreconcilable principles.11  But Daubert at least possesses interdiscipli-
nary reference points; that is more than we can confidently say about 
intellectual property law’s vision of science, as embodied in our patent 
system.
use of bitemark analyses but concluding that there exists a need for more research into 
error rates and proper techniques).  In contrast, judicial acceptance of bitemark evi-
dence has waned after misleading bitemark evidence led to several postconviction ex-
onerations.  Cf. Michael J. Saks, The Legal and Scientific Evaluation of Forensic Science (Es-
pecially Fingerprint Expert Testimony), 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1167, 1168-70 (2003) 
(noting that, despite assurances by forensic dentists as to bitemark analysis’s accuracy 
and precision, one study “revealed an average of 64% false positives and an average of 
22% false negatives”). 
9 The impact of legal and political choices on the trajectory of research was tragi-
cally revealed during the HIV/AIDS epidemic of the 1980s.  See generally RANDY SHILTS,
AND THE BAND PLAYED ON: POLITICS, PEOPLE, AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC (1987) (criti-
cizing the U.S. government’s failure to address, through research funding or other as-
sistance, the AIDS epidemic of the early 1980s). 
10 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-95 (1993). 
11 See, e.g., David Crump, The Trouble with Daubert-Kumho:  Reconsidering the Su-
preme Court’s Philosophy of Science, 68 MO. L. REV. 1, 19 (2003) (“The cases do not ex-
press any recognition of the other two ingredients in the triad [of science], concept 
and computation.  Instead, they seem to make everything depend on falsifiability, 
which is to say, on observation. . . . [T]he Supreme Court in Daubert may have reduced 
the meaning of science to only a part of itself.”); Margaret G. Farrell, Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.:  Epistemiology and Legal Process, 15 CARDOZO L. REV.
2183, 2183 (1994) (“Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion in Daubert . . . acknowledges 
that law and science have different goals, but it fails to recognize the implications of 
those differences for legal process.”); John H. Mansfield, Scientific Evidence Under 
Daubert, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 12 (1996) (“[Karl H.] Popper’s ideas about valid scien-
tific knowledge [which influenced the establishment of the Daubert test] do not readily 
lend themselves to adoption in a legal rule. . . . His urging that hypotheses be devel-
oped that are prima facie easily falsified does not lead to any view as to when a hy-
pothesis should be considered scientifically valid.”).  But see Brian Leiter, The Epistemol-
ogy of Admissibility:  Why Even Good Philosophy of Science Would Not Make for Good Philosophy 
of Evidence, 1997 BYU L. REV. 803, 805 (“For even if ‘revised empiricist’ philosophy of 
science were the dominant, or even the correct, philosophy of science, there would be 
no reason to think admissibility standards ought to conform to it:  Feldman seems to 
confuse the philosopher’s question . . . with the lawyer’s question . . . .”). 
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Patent law distinguishes between two products of research:  dis-
coveries and inventions.  All patentable inventions are either discover-
ies or creations, but not all discoveries and creations are patentable 
inventions.12  These categories are foreign to how scientists talk about 
and conduct their business, except when they discuss patent law and 
the commercial implications of their research.  What is and is not pat-
entable is in no way coextensive with the boundaries scientists other-
wise, let alone “naturally,” use to identify endeavors within their fields. 
Legal literature defends its distinctions by pointing out that scien-
tists participate in open, productive, and collaborative basic research 
despite the lack of attendant intellectual property protection.  Legal 
academics describe this collaboration as a “norm” of basic research.  
Yet this norm did not emerge in the absence of legal, economic, and 
political frameworks, but specifically in light of them.  The legal literature 
speaks of science as if it were an isolated ritual, as if the orienting goal 
of our patent system—encouraging invention—was wholly superflu-
ous, and as if attaching monopolies to some research products but not 
to others has little impact on a scientist’s career choices or research 
priorities or, more broadly, the trajectory of scientific research.  Law, 
in short, either disregards or denies altogether the untidy conse-
quences of its interventions upon science. 
This Article reconsiders the discovery/invention distinction, 
borne out at the boundaries of the legal doctrines of patentable sub-
ject matter, as well as the implications of that distinction for the scien-
tific enterprise.  If there are consequences in the type of research pro-
jects that scientists pursue, in the distribution of research talent across 
disciplines, or in the funding priorities of our body politic, then we 
should want to base them on something other than tenuous con-
structs of legalistic metaphysics.  We should aim to acknowledge, if not 
altogether avoid, legal mischaracterizations of science shaping the en-
terprise and trajectory of science itself. 
I argue that the discovery/invention distinction is analytically 
tenuous—untethered to scientific theory or practice and imperiled by 
the trajectory of legal opinion.  Yet it is a deeply consequential con-
struct.  Too often, lawyers portray the patent system as somehow inci-
dental to the scientific enterprise.  But what would inventors be doing 
12 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful im-
provement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and re-
quirements of this title.”). 
2009] Reinventing Discovery 2181
if they were not inventing?  We hope to encourage invention as op-
posed to what?  Basic research thrives without intellectual property pro-
tection compared to which hypothetical alternative?  By partitioning scien-
tific research products into two categories—only one of which we 
protect as intellectual property—patent law almost certainly affects 
the distribution of scientific talent and the focus of research.  Even if 
these effects are marginal, they are worth discussing because they re-
main underacknowledged. 
Even if there is no convincing reason, in principle, to distinguish 
unpatentable discoveries from patentable inventions, there may be 
practical reasons to do so.  Scholars have rehashed this discussion 
time and again since the First World War.  I re-engage the conversa-
tion not to concoct an ambitious solution—say, a novel “scientific 
property” right—but to reconsider the consequences of the law’s bi-
furcated vision of science.  These consequences include distortions in 
the scientific enterprise that encourage researchers to do some things 
rather than others and chronic instances of legal over- and underin-
clusion when we label research products “property” or “not property.”  
The former consequence raises important questions of economic effi-
ciency; the latter suggests a troubling discontinuity between patent 
and takings jurisprudence. 
The Article concludes with a brief discussion of the perils pre-
sented by a legal academy that construes its interventions on science 
as something other than interventions—as a disciplinary default that is 
no default at all. 
I. THE LEGAL CANON: MAN AND NATURE
A.  Economic Principle, Ontological Categories 
The origins of, incentives for, and rationales behind our patent 
system have been recited many times over.13  The general aim of pat-
ent protection is explicit in the constitutional text from which the 
patent system derives:  “To promote the Progress of Science and use-
ful Arts.”14  The tradeoffs of this formulation have been apparent since 
13 See, e.g., ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND 
POLICY 1-16, 67-68 (4th ed. 2007) (describing the development of patent law in the 
United States); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1031, 1031 (2005) (explaining the conventional view that patent protection in the 
United States is “about generating incentives to create”). 
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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the Venetian patent statute of 1474, which cultivated “ingenious” 
works and “devices” by extending ten-year monopolies to inventors.15
Today we frame those tradeoffs using the parlance and conceptual to-
pography of modern economics, focusing discussions around the so-
called “public-goods problem.”  But the core concern—balancing 
deadweight losses of monopoly power with innovation deficits when 
investors cannot recoup the costs of research—has been well re-
hearsed for centuries.16
If our patent system aims to solve a public-goods problem, then we 
should extend patent monopolies only to those innovations that would 
otherwise be underincentivized.17  Yet patent review famously lacks 
15 The Venetian statute states that 
every person who shall build any new and ingenious device in this City, not 
previously made in our Commonwealth, shall give notice of it to the office of 
our General Welfare Board when it has been reduced to perfection so that it 
can be used and operated.  It being forbidden to every other person in any of 
our territories and towns to make any further device conforming with and 
similar to said one, without the consent and license of the author, for the term 
of 10 years. 
Giulio Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450–1550), 30 J. PAT. OFFICE SOC’Y 166, 177 (1948) 
(quoting the Venetian Patent Statute of 1474). 
16 Patents have also been justified by natural rights theory, but the theory’s heyday 
has long passed.  A natural right to property should be a right in perpetuity, as a mat-
ter of desert:  an inventor owns her invention, and should monopolistically own her in-
vention, since her innovation was hers and hers alone.  Yet we grant no such right.  Pat-
ents are limited to twenty-year monopoly rents.  Moreover, the natural rights view sits 
uneasily with coinvention:  if several inventors have independently derived an idea and 
reduced it to practice, the order of invention should not matter.  But how many coex-
tensive monopolies can exist before we are no longer talking about monopolies?  The 
polymath Robert Nozick argued that a natural rights theory may be unsatisfying be-
cause we will in time reinvent almost everything.  Teleology is at play:  inventions are 
solutions to practical needs and, given eight billion industrious, inventive folks, light-
ning will often (if not always) strike twice.  See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND 
UTOPIA 181-82 (1974) (suggesting that patent time limits serve “as a rough rule of 
thumb” for approximating the amount of time that independent invention would have 
taken).  Natural rights theory cannot accommodate teleology, and so an irony of our 
intellectual property framework is that the dominant theory—social good—is in thrall 
with an old-fashioned teleological dogma:  that nature is out there, awaiting discovery 
as Truth and revelation.  Part III addresses the influence of this anachronistic, story-
book view of science upon our intellectual property law. 
17 The paradigmatic economic vision of patent law comes from Judge Richard 
Posner’s concurring opinion in Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 723 F.2d 1324, 1345 (7th 
Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., concurring), in which he argues that “[t]he purpose of allowing 
people to obtain patents is strictly utilitarian—to create incentives to invent useful 
things.” See also David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously:  The 
Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter 6 (Boston Coll. Law Sch. Legal Studies Re-
search Paper Series, Research Paper No. 163, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
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such precision, rendering that ambition elusive.18  Moreover, such a 
thoroughly modern economic formulation is largely incidental to the 
established ontological requirements of patentable subject matter.19
In the constitutional text defining Congress’s copyright and pat-
ent power, “useful Arts” is the imperative phrase.20  Congress and the 
courts have interpreted “useful” to limit patent protection to applied 
technology, as distinguished from basic scientific research.  Hence, 
the Patent Act formally defines patentable subject matter as “any new 
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, 
or any new and useful improvement thereof.”21
Yet statutory and constitutional text can only tell us so much about 
patentable subject matter, for the case law has “acquired a distinctly 
common law feel” over the centuries.22  The interaction of statutory 
and common law has, at various times, placed “works of nature,”23
“law[s] of nature,”24 “theoretical discoveries,”25 “abstract intellectual 
concepts,”26 “fundamental truth[s],”27 and simply “[a]n idea . . . it-
self”28 all beyond the pale.  In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Supreme 
Court famously asserted that “laws of nature, physical phenomena, 
and abstract ideas” cannot be patented.29  Thus the Court seemingly 
qualified its own interpretation of legislative history, stated just a 
abstract=933167 (“[F]or much of U.S. history the federal courts took it upon them-
selves to analyze classes of subject matter and exclude from patentability those types of 
innovation for which the patent grant likely would increase beneficial invention by less 
than the patent monopoly would cost society.”). 
18 A banality of contemporary patent scholarship is that we extend patents to many 
research products that neither merit nor require monopoly protection.  See, e.g., Mark 
Lemley et al., What to Do About Bad Patents, REGULATION, Winter 2006, at 10, 10-12; 
Lawrence Lessig, The Problem with Patents, INDUSTRY STANDARD, Apr. 23, 1999, 
http://www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,4296,00.html. 
19 In other words, the doctrinal requirements of patentable subject matter—
novelty, nonobviousness, enablement, and so forth—are at best incidentally related to 
those research products that do, or do not, receive an optimal level of social, political, 
and economic incentives.  As the case law has shown, these are fundamentally onto-
logical categories, not economic ones. 
20 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
21 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
22 MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 13, at 68. 
23 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
24 O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 132 (1854) (Grier, J., dissenting). 
25 Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939). 
26 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
27 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978) (quoting Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67). 
28 Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874). 
29 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
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paragraph prior, that “anything under the sun that is made by man” is 
fair game.30
These restrictions—including the so-called “law of nature” excep-
tion—limit the set of innovations deemed patentable.  It is worth at 
least asking whether this combination of criteria represents a reason-
able proxy for identifying the research products and innovations sus-
ceptible to a public-goods problem.  The dominant rationale for pat-
ent protection is not necessarily or intuitively coextensive with the 
ancient ontological categories that define subject-matter patentability 
in American law.31
A tangle of distinctions at this scale and frequency suggests that 
the race between legal line drawing and scientific ingenuity is no con-
test at all.  Jurists have frequently engaged in intellectual contortions 
to partition science into two distinct boxes—often dodging their own 
jurisprudential formulations in doing so—but the normative ration-
ales for their acrobatics have rarely survived scrutiny. 
Early American cases often ignored or wholly disavowed meta-
physical constructs distinguishing between “natural” principles and 
“man-made” products.  They focused instead on concrete statutory 
demands of patent law, insisting, for instance, that inventions demon-
strate a connection to the useful arts.  One prominent commentator 
thus interpreted O’Reilly v. Morse 32 to “turn[] entirely upon a view 
taken of [the patent holder’s] general claim, which gave it an extent 
30 Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2394, 2399; H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).  Robert Merges and John Duffy have 
suggested that there is some inconsistency between this broad statement and the re-
strictions that the Court has placed on patentable subject matter: 
 To see the tension between these two statements, carefully consider the in-
vention as described in footnote 1 of the Court’s opinion.  Chakrabarty dis-
covered that naturally occurring plasmids capable of breaking down the com-
ponents of oil could be combined into a naturally occurring host bacterium.  
Isn’t it merely a physical phenomenon that the oil-degrading plasmids can be 
maintained within the bacterium? 
MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 13, at 77.  Or one might simply ask, in what sense are ab-
stract ideas not developed by men and women? 
31 Indeed, I argue that it is precisely because of a public-goods problem that we 
publicly fund scientific research that is explicitly cut off from patent protection by the 
metaphysical quirks and shifting exceptions in our common law framework.  See infra
Section III.B. 
32 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854).  The O’Reilly Court held Samuel Morse’s claim on 
any use of an electric current to print characters at a distance invalid as an overly 
broad claim on an “idea.”  The Court upheld the other seven claims from Morse’s 
telegraph patent that applied the principle to particular machinery. 
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that divested it of all conditions and made it an abstraction.”33  Justice 
Felix Frankfurter similarly railed against quasi metaphysics in Funk 
Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. nearly a century later, arguing that 
“[i]t only confuses the issue . . . to introduce such terms as ‘the work 
of nature’ and the ‘laws of nature.’  For these are vague and malleable 
terms infected with too much ambiguity and equivocation.”34  Con-
temporary scholars have shared Justice Frankfurter’s skepticism.  One 
recent article suggested that the doctrine of inherency can help dis-
tinguish patentable from unpatentable research products, rendering 
much of the law of nature exception analytically superfluous.35
Even if doctrines like nonobviousness, utility, and novelty can tell 
us what inventions are not patentable, they cannot tell us which inno-
vations should be considered intellectual property.  The law of nature 
exception is not solely concerned with what is statutorily patentable; it 
often arises in conversations about what ought to be considered 
“property” in the first place.  To the extent that patents, copyrights, 
and trademarks exhaust our forms of intellectual property, what is
patentable and what products should be considered intellectual prop-
erty may descriptively align.  However, there is no reason that they 
necessarily should be one and the same.  References to, and reliance 
upon, the law of nature exception is not evidence of anxiety about the 
insufficiency of other patent doctrines, their actual insufficiency, or 
even ignorance of those doctrines.  They are, rather, expressions of 
anxiety about the appropriate bounds of intellectual property protec-
tion for the whole range of scientific insights and innovations. 
33 GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL IN-
VENTIONS, AS ENACTED AND ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 159, at 
184-85 (4th ed. 1873), quoted in MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 13, at 98. 
34 333 U.S. 127, 134-35 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
35 As Burk and Lemley argue, 
 Inherency also seems well-suited to explaining the prohibition against pat-
enting laws of nature.  The objection . . . seems to be that such principles are 
“inherent” in the universe, waiting to be discovered, and so not the product of 
human ingenuity.  Yet this characterization flies in the face of the current un-
derstanding that scientific “laws” are human constructs, clearly the products of 
human ingenuity, as is the language of mathematics in which such laws are 
expressed.  The distinction between “invention” and “discovery” cannot credi-
bly account for declining to patent such human formulations.  However, these 
principles may well be said to be in public use, benefiting the public, even if 
their formulation is unarticulated or unexpressed. 
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371, 408 (2006) 
(footnotes omitted). 
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Whether a scientific product is patentable is a matter of patent 
law’s internal (and fundamentally “legal”—meaning quasi-
sociological, quasi-economic, and quasi-philosophical) logic.36  But 
whether patent law draws reasonable distinctions in defining what sci-
entific products should or should not be deemed property is a matter 
outside of patent law’s formal doctrinal logic.  It is at that periphery—
the partition between property and nonproperty—that the law of na-
ture exception rightly or wrongly holds singular valence. 
To summarize, a discovery may be unpatentable for two broad 
reasons:  First, it may fail to meet the basic statutory criteria.  Second, 
its subject matter may somehow be beyond the patentable pale (i.e., it 
seemingly meets statutory requirements but is made an exception be-
cause of some elemental characteristic).  Even if a discovery accords 
with every statutory requirement on the books, it cannot be patented 
if it falls within a common law exception to the statutory guidelines.  
And so the law of nature exception perseveres.  It holds currency pre-
cisely because of its quasi metaphysics, rather than in spite of them. 
B.  Law’s Astrology 
1.  A Proliferation of Tests 
Tests for patentable subject matter are famously short lived.  
American courts have formulated and rejected an array of exceptions 
to the class of innovations that would otherwise be patentable.  The 
natural-phenomenon test, the physical-transformation test,37  the men-
tal-steps doctrine,38 the mathematic-algorithm exception,39 and the 
business-method exception40 are all examples of constructs conjured, 
then qualified or abandoned altogether through the evolution of pat-
36 That logic is infused with metaphysical speculations like the law of nature ex-
ception.  Patent doctrines were not developed in some presocial abstract, but rather 
were created precisely with a vision of what we are comfortable with patenting. 
37 See, e.g., Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1877) (stating that a patentable 
process is “an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be trans-
formed and reduced to a different state or thing”). 
38 This doctrine attempted to remove mathematical formulas, methods of compu-
tation, or other mental operations from the realm of patentable subject matter.  See,
e.g., In re Heritage, 150 F.2d 554, 556 (C.C.P.A. 1945) (“[P]urely mental acts are not 
proper subject matter for protection under the patent statutes . . . .”). 
39 See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978). 
40 See Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467, 469 (2d Cir. 1908) (“A 
system of transacting business disconnected from the means for carrying out the sys-
tem is not . . . an art.  Advice is not patentable.”). 
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entable-subject-matter jurisprudence.  A familiar lament of patent 
scholars is that courts abandoned their gatekeeping responsibilities as 
they abandoned these tests, allowing the set of inventions deemed 
patentable to balloon.41  The rise and fall of tests may, indeed, consti-
tute an abdication of sorts.  But logical coherence—rather than judi-
cial irresponsibility—has spurred the abandonment.42  These tests 
have proven ever malleable and provisional, incapable of successfully 
grappling with borderline cases and emerging technologies.43
Thus, the most enduring exception to patentable material is 
among the oldest and most analytically slippery:  laws of nature, natu-
ral phenomena, and abstract ideas—none of these may be awarded 
monopoly rents.  Arguably, it is from this foundational observation 
that later (and late) tests of patentable subject matter were derived.  
After all, it is not immediately apparent what makes a phenomenon 
natural or an idea abstract, nor is it clear what differentiates them 
from unnatural (man-made?) phenomena or concrete ideas.  Jurists 
have crafted a bevy of tests at least in part to make sense of these lines, 
to render them coherent and applicable.  By and large, their efforts 
have failed. 
Legal habit compels us to cordon off certain innovations as un-
patentable if we hope to have a working patent system.  (For what is a 
legal category without a line?)  By implication, jurists have simply got-
ten their formulations consistently wrong.44  At some stage, however, 
41 See, e.g., Olson, supra note 17, at 63 (“[T]he federal courts’ abandonment of the 
subject matter patentability gatekeeper role has decreased total social utility and [Pat-
ent and Trademark Office] efficiency.”). 
42 See Robert P. Merges, Property Rights Theory and the Commons:  The Case of Scientific 
Research, in SCIENTIFIC INNOVATION, PHILOSOPHY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 145, 155-56 
(Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1996) (“[I]t is perhaps surprising that basic research is 
now considered an entirely proper source of patentable subject matter. . . . To some 
extent, this is a result of growing sophistication by patent lawyers, who have learned to 
state a scientific finding in terms of an at least nominally useful application.”). 
43 In particular, these tests did not survive the rise of computer hardware and soft-
ware, and they similarly could not grapple with the blurred line between basic and ap-
plied science in the field of biotechnology.  The death knell of many of these tests, and 
arguably the gatekeeping role of courts, came in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), 
which ostensibly overturned Flook by permitting nonphysical computer programs to be 
patented.
44 The theory that jurists have made incessant mistakes of this sort is popular in 
the patent-reform literature. See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why “Bad” Patents 
Survive in the Market and How Should We Change?—The Private and Social Costs of Patents,
55 EMORY L.J. 61, 90-92 (2006) (noting that the problem of courts’ lack of information 
or experience to evaluate patent applications has been exacerbated by “the increase of 
patents on Internet business methods and software technology”). 
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we should ask whether a jurisprudence marked by incessant failures 
suggests an underlying deficiency in its premise.  In the case of patent 
jurisprudence, that would mean a closer scrutiny of the law of nature 
exception itself and of the division that it projects between man and 
nature, irrespective of scientific history, principle, or practice.  Let us 
thus turn to the origins of the exception and its epistemic roots. 
2.  Laws of Nature, Laws of Men 
One of the Supreme Court’s earliest invocations of the law of na-
ture exception—and arguably the first of its regular tautologies on the 
topic—was in Le Roy v. Tatham.45  There, the Court sweepingly con-
cluded that “a principle is not patentable.  A principle, in the abstract, 
is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be 
patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.”46
In other words, courts cannot give monopoly rents to a “fundamental 
truth,” “original cause,” or “motive,” because such insights cannot be 
patented.  O’Reilly v. Morse later reiterated that principle, if not its rea-
soning, in holding that “the discovery of a principle in natural phi-
losophy or physical science, is not patentable.”47  The question of why
one may not hold such a right—due to law, logic, or nature—
remained ambiguous. 
In the century since, scholars and jurists have generally relied on 
two answers to this question.  One relates to pragmatic concerns (e.g., 
would such a right be economically desirable or efficient, and even if 
so, how could we ever practically exclude others from using a basic 
principle?); the other relates to metaphysical considerations.  I bracket
at present questions of law and policy, such as whether discoveries can 
be or are patentable, or whether we should pragmatically want them 
to be patentable.  The focus of this subsection is nature itself:  whether 
removing scientific principles or discoveries from patentable subject 
matter is analytically sound. 
45 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174-75 (1853). 
46 Id. at 175. 
47 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 116 (1854).  To be fair, while O’Reilly does not explain 
why a discovery should be unpatentable, it at least draws a workable line, unlike most 
other subject-matter cases.  Justice Grier’s view—a common interpretation of the 
case—is that this rule arose from the utility requirement:  that patents should only ap-
ply to an inventor “who takes this new element or power [of nature], as yet useless, 
from the laboratory of the philosopher, and makes it the servant of man.”  Id. at 132 
(Grier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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Later cases articulated the metaphysical core of the law of nature 
exception.  The Supreme Court’s paradigmatic statement of this 
metaphysics, against which Justice Frankfurter railed, came in Funk 
Bros.:
[P]atents cannot issue for the discovery of the phenomena of nature. . . . 
The qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun, electricity, or the 
qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men.  
They are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved 
exclusively to none.  He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon 
of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes.
48
The notion of a shared “storehouse” in nature—a sort of public 
library in the cosmos packed with “manifestations” of natural laws, 
marked by open access, universal check-out rights, and, presumably, a 
baffling card catalogue—is a central motif in the logic of the discov-
ery/invention distinction and the law of nature exception. 
The Court famously reiterated this language and reasoning in 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, distinguishing between man-made constructs 
and manifestations of nature.49  The Chakrabarty Court declared that 
“Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that E=mc2; nor could 
Newton have patented the law of gravity.”50  The inventor in Chakra-
barty merited a patent, the Court explained, because his claim was 
“not to a hitherto unknown natural phenomenon, but to a non-
naturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter—a product 
of human ingenuity.”51  The innovation, then, was “not nature’s 
handiwork, but his own.”52  “[T]he relevant distinction,” for the Chak-
rabarty majority, “was not between living and inanimate things, but 
between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made 
inventions.”53
Chakrabarty’s dichotomies—between nature’s ingenuity and man’s 
insights, between natural elements and man-made products—are em-
blematic.  They have been repeated in various iterations for centuries.  
The underlying principle at play is this:  Equations and abstract ideas 
are not human creations.  They can be categorically distinguished 
from confabulations like radiators, medications, or—as in Chakra-
48 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
49 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 310. 
53 Id. at 313. 
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barty—artificially created life forms.54  This motif has emerged fre-
quently in American courts, constituting a shared judicial mythology 
of science. 
Scientific progress, as imagined in American law schools and bar 
associations, slowly reveals a static, underlying reality—discovered and 
as of yet undiscovered rules, perpetually there, waiting to be plucked 
from the heavens.  “The underlying notion,” argued the Court in 
Parker v. Flook, “is that a scientific principle, such as that expressed in 
respondent’s algorithm, reveals a relationship that has always ex-
isted.”55  These rules, once revealed, are manifestations of nature.  
They are not properly classified as “inventions” because they are not 
confabulations thought up and constructed by particular individuals, 
but rather the shared store of mankind, common property that we 
have all always owned (blind to that ownership though we collectively 
have been).  “Discover differs from invent,” asserted the holding of In
re Kemper.56  “We discover what before existed.  We invent what did not 
before exist . . . . Invention differs from discovery.  Invention is ap-
plied to the contrivance and production of something that did not be-
fore exist.  Discovery brings to light that which existed before, but 
which was not known.”57  Both discoveries and inventions, in this view, 
are accomplishments of man, but only inventions are created by man.  
It is unclear what we discover when we discover—heavenly clockwork 
or ambivalent Darwinian materialities.  But whatever it is, it is already 
out there:  discoverers find it, while inventors create anew. 
54 Arguably, creating a hard-and-fast distinction between discoveries and inven-
tions may make more sense if we are talking about tangible elements of nature—for 
instance, stumbling upon previously undocumented plants, animals, and chemicals.  
See Letter from Mark Lemley to author (Apr. 4, 2007) (on file with author).  That we 
describe finding and identifying these elements of nature as “discoveries” reflects the 
broad spectrum of things we class as “discoveries.”  The dangers of such an expansive 
use of the term are discussed infra note 82. 
 Of course, “discovering” a previously unknown plant or animal is quite different 
from “discovering” practical uses for them—manipulations (actual or conceptual) that 
answer our questions and meet our needs.  Even if we believe that species are simply 
species, identifying uses for them is clearly tied to human endeavors and interests—
that is, utility.  Such “discoveries” are significant primarily because they introduce new 
tools to meet human needs.  Unsurprisingly, such “discoveries” are often patentable 
subject matter.  The same arguably cannot be said of merely identifying new plants, 
animals, or chemicals. 
55 437 U.S. 584, 593 n.15 (1978). 
56 14 F. Cas. 286, 287 (C.C.D.C. 1841) (No. 7687) (quoting the then-current edi-
tion of Webster’s Dictionary).
57 Id.
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This vision of science holds that Truths are afloat, awaiting discov-
ery by luck, perseverance, or both.  It is only a matter of time before 
someone discovers that it is not phlogiston, but oxygen, that explains 
the burning of wood.58  Because these insights are Truths, they are a 
shared legacy, free to all.  To strip them from the commons and place 
them into the hands of individuals would be akin to exercising inverse 
eminent domain upon the laws of nature, God’s handiwork, the ele-
gant universe:  taking from the commons and giving to the few.  From 
this perspective, allowing patents on discoveries would be savagely 
monopolistic and perhaps borderline heretical. 
What a dramatic vision of science, and what a rich lineage it bears!  
Its ancient tropes appear throughout the writings of the great scien-
tists and theologians of history.59  That laws of nature are Truths to be 
uncovered and mastered by reason is a notion that continues to hold 
deep intuitive sway.  There is no way to disprove this conjecture.  But 
that is a far cry from saying that it is a reasonable cornerstone of mod-
ern patent law. 
C.  Accounting for Science 
The law of nature exception perseveres, but the vision of science 
upon which it rests has fared poorly over the centuries.  Pragmatists of 
the last 150 years, inspired by Darwinian principles of change over 
time, have reformulated how we think and talk about Truth (in part, 
by bracketing the conversation altogether).  Historians and philoso-
phers of science—not only Kuhn, but also Holton, Latour, Feyera-
bend, Popper, Shapin and Schaffer, and so on—have altered the basic 
narrative of science’s history from an unbending teleological march to 
one of rich contingency, informed by cultural, political, aesthetic, re-
ligious, and ideological reference points.60  Their histories and ap-
proaches suggest that scientific “truths” tend to change. 
58 For a broad overview of phlogiston theory in the history of chemistry, see 
RICHARD MORRIS, THE LAST SORCERERS: THE PATH FROM ALCHEMY TO THE PERIODIC 
TABLE (2003). 
59 See, e.g., THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICAE (Timothy McDermott ed., 
1989); ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Terence Irwin trans., 2d ed. 1999); JOHN W.
CARROLL, LAWS OF NATURE (1994). 
60 See, e.g., PAUL FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD (1975); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE 
BIRTH OF THE CLINIC: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF MEDICAL PERCEPTION (A.M. Sheridan 
Smith trans., 1973); GERALD HOLTON, THEMATIC ORIGINS OF SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT:
KEPLER TO EINSTEIN (1973). 
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We cannot expect, and probably do not want, law to reflect all of 
these developments—many of which are so arcane, controversial, and 
abstract that unloading them in our courtrooms and legislative cham-
bers would be deeply delegitimizing.61  But when law wades into other 
disciplines—when it makes statements of deep structural consequence 
about, say, the nature of science—we should want it to be responsive 
to those fields that it deigns to characterize and mold.  And yet, pat-
entable-subject-matter jurisprudence is filled with metaphysical curi-
osities that bear little resemblance to how historians of science, phi-
losophers, or even scientists think about science.  Let us, then, briefly 
turn outwards. 
1.  Laws in Nature 
In the view of the law of nature exception, unpatentable discover-
ies are “manifestations of laws of nature,”62 ever present if heretofore 
hidden.  It is science’s duty and destiny to gradually, teleologically ac-
crue such fundamental Truths.  This narrative would be considered 
endearingly antiquated in other disciplines.  It would, for instance, be 
deeply ungenerous to characterize even those who embrace the corre-
spondence theory of truth as arguing that unpatentable scientific dis-
coveries accurately represent an underlying Truth in nature.63  But it 
may be worth briefly highlighting sources that have critically undercut 
the sustainability of such a view in other fields, despite its continued 
relevance in law. 
a.  The Pragmatists 
One source was American pragmatism, which emerged at the end 
of the nineteenth century.  Pragmatists and their intellectual prog-
eny—a group that includes a vast swath of philosophers, historians of 
61 See, e.g., Leiter, supra note 11 (discussing the difficulty of applying current con-
ceptions of scientific truth to the rules of evidence). 
62 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
63 The most common form of this argument, instead, is that certain scientific in-
sights have a special relationship to the world.  See, e.g., PETER GODFREY-SMITH, THE-
ORY AND REALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 188-89 (2003) 
(discussing the application of the correspondence theory, which holds that “there is 
some kind of special and valuable relationship between true theories and the world”).  
Modern debates tend to focus on the “responsiveness” of scientific theories to the ac-
tual world around us, rather than the far more radical epistemic claim that particular 
scientific discoveries somehow accurately represent some static truth in the world 
around us, or that we can ever know such a thing for certain.  See id. at 154. 
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science, and legal scholars—complicated the notion of a Truth in the 
ether, discernible by science.  They argued that we could never know 
if discoveries constituted the “true” nature of things and so considered 
such debates irresolvable.64  William James famously wrote that prag-
matism is “primarily a method of settling metaphysical disputes that 
otherwise might be interminable.”65  It is not that pragmatists found 
discussions about the correspondence of a truth to an underlying real-
ity somehow incorrect; they simply found these discussions inconclu-
sive and fundamentally unhelpful and quixotic.66  Debates over the re-
ality of Truth, or the correspondence of scientific theories to that 
Truth, were, in James’s famous example, akin to arguments about chas-
ing a squirrel around a tree:  they were all bound to be interminable.67
The pragmatists’ approach to truth and science elevated experi-
mentalism over stasis, construing universalism as a descriptive element 
of science’s applicability rather than as a facet of its origins.  In 
James’s famous formulation, “[t]he truth of an idea is not a stagnant 
property inherent in it.  Truth happens to an idea.  It becomes true, is 
64 As William James wrote, pragmatism 
converts the absolutely empty notion of a static relation of “correspondence” 
(what that may mean we must ask later) between our minds and reality, into 
that of a rich and active commerce (that anyone may follow in detail and un-
derstand) between particular thoughts of ours, and the great universe of other 
experiences in which they play their parts and have their uses. 
WILLIAM JAMES, What Pragmatism Means, in PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD
WAYS OF THINKING 19, 30-31 (Barnes & Noble 2003) (1907).
65 Id. at 20. 
66 Richard Rorty explained that “truth is not a goal of inquiry. . . . A goal is some-
thing you can know that you are getting closer to, or farther away from.  But there is 
no way to know our distance from truth, nor even whether we are closer to it than our 
ancestors were.”  RICHARD RORTY, TRUTH AND PROGRESS 3-4 (1998).  Rorty argued that 
the heart of pragmatism is its nonrepresentationalism.  See id. at 2 (“[P]hilosophy will 
get along better without the notions of ‘the intrinsic nature of reality’ and ‘correspon-
dence to reality’ than with them.  For those who find these notions indispensable, but 
only for them, this will look like an argument that there is no truth.”). 
67 James explained that 
[t]he pragmatic method in such cases is to try to interpret each notion by trac-
ing its respective practical consequences.  What difference would it practically 
make to anyone if this notion rather than that notion were true?  If no practi-
cal difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean practically 
the same thing, and all dispute is idle. 
JAMES, supra note 64, at 20. 
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made true by events.”68  James’s contemporary, John Dewey, applied 
this pragmatic vision of truth to the scientific enterprise: 
[T]heory began to count in the sciences . . . when . . . dogmatism was re-
placed by the use of hypotheses in conducting experimental observa-
tions to bind concrete facts together in systems of increasing temporal-
spatial extent.  The universality that belongs to scientific theories is not 
that of inherent content fixed by God or Nature, but of range of appli-
cability—of capacity to take events out of their apparent isolation so as to 
order them into systems which (as is the case with all living things) prove 
they are alive by the kind of change which is growth.  From the stand-
point of scientific inquiry nothing is more fatal to its right to obtain ac-
ceptance than a claim that its conclusions are final and hence incapable 
of a development that is other than mere quantitative extension.
69
Dewey suggested that we look at ideas and discoveries not as 
Truths, but as provisional tools for understanding and grappling with 
our world.70  Louis Menand further explained that 
 Dewey thought that ideas and beliefs are the same as hands:  instru-
ments for coping.  An idea has no greater metaphysical stature than, say, 
a fork.  When your fork proves inadequate to the task of eating soup, it 
makes little sense to argue about whether there is something inherent in 
the nature of forks . . . that accounts for that failure.  You just reach for a 
spoon. . . . Knowledge is not a copy of something that exists independ-
ently of its being known, “it is an instrument or organ of successful action.”
71
This is too limited a space to do justice to the rich heterogeneity 
of the pragmatists’ accounts of truth.72  Yet as nearly every pragmatist 
68 WILLIAM JAMES, Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth, in PRAGMATISM, supra note 64, 
at 86, 88. 
69 JOHN DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY 14 (Beacon Press 1950) (1920).  
This passage reflects the influence of Darwinian principles on many pragmatists.  They 
observed that facts of science transformed over time into other truths.  This transfor-
mation is embodied by Dewey’s recurring metaphor of “growth.”  Id. at 48. 
70 Dewey’s and James’s pragmatisms were not one and the same—indeed, they 
emerged out of vastly different intellectual backgrounds.  (Dewey’s was grounded in 
Hegelian thought; James disdained Hegel.)  But their views, however different, are 
considered core articulations of an identifiable “pragmatic” philosophy.  See LOUIS
MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 358-60 (2001). 
71 Id. at 361 (quoting JOHN DEWEY, The Bearings of Pragmatism upon Education, in 4 
THE MIDDLE WORKS, 1899–1924, at 178, 180 ( Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1977)). 
72 Compare, e.g., HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY 216 (1981), with
RICHARD RORTY, supra note 66, ch. 2 (responding to Putnam’s criticism of Rorty).  
Some have even argued that the “pragmatic tradition” actually represents two distinct 
and divergent philosophies that reflect a fundamental misunderstanding between the 
two “fathers” of American pragmatism, Charles Peirce and William James.  See H.O.
MOUNCE, THE TWO PRAGMATISMS: FROM PEIRCE TO RORTY 231 (1997). 
2009] Reinventing Discovery 2195
predicted, debates continue over the correspondence theory of truth.  
Whether scientific theories embody something real in nature remains 
as unresolved as the pragmatists predicted it would be a century ago.  
The pragmatists’ vision of science and its relationship to truth is nei-
ther the most unorthodox nor the most conservative approach devel-
oped in the last century.  Their view is an emblematic one, though, 
pointing to an underlying deficiency of “law of nature” metaphysics. 
b.  Beyond Verification 
The writings of Karl Popper offer another reference point,73 illus-
trating how many scientists think about their trade.74  Philosophers of 
science tend not to view Popper with the reverence that he enjoys 
from many scientists and public figures like Justice Blackmun75 and 
Nassim Nicholas Taleb.76  Some philosophers have even branded Pop-
73 I limit the examples to Popper and the pragmatists, not because their argu-
ments represent an academic mainstream or have fared especially well over the years, 
but because they are deeply influential.  The full story of the breakdown of archaic 
naturalism—perhaps the best way to describe the metaphysics of the law of nature ex-
ception—would include a sweeping array of figures and movements, from Hume to 
Goodman, from the logical positivists to Quine.  My goal is not to account for a century 
of scholarship in the philosophy of science, but to highlight trends that have catalyzed 
the breakdown of archaic quasi-Platonic notions of what science is and what it can do. 
74 Peter Godfrey-Smith writes that  
 Karl Popper is the only philosopher discussed in this book who is regarded 
as a hero by many scientists.  Attitudes toward philosophy among scientists 
vary, but hardly ever does a philosopher succeed in inspiring scientists in the 
way Popper has.  It is also rare for a philosopher’s view of science to be used 
within a scientific debate to justify one position over another.  That has hap-
pened with Popper too. 
GODFREY-SMITH, supra note 63, at 57. 
75 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (“[T]he cri-
terion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability.” 
(alteration in original) (quoting KARL R. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS:
THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989))). 
76 See NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, FOOLED BY RANDOMNESS: THE HIDDEN ROLE OF 
CHANCE IN THE MARKETS AND IN LIFE 106 (2001) (“Popper came up with a major an-
swer to the problem of induction (to me he came up with the answer).  No man has 
influenced the way scientists do science more than Sir Karl—in spite of the fact that 
many of his fellow professional philosophers find him quite naïve . . . .”). 
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per a naïve falsificationist,77 but that is precisely what makes his writ-
ings particularly useful for our purposes.78
Popper is, of course, best known for the idea that falsificationism 
can be used as a litmus test for science—a solution to the demarcation 
problem of distinguishing scientific from nonscientific insights.  Pop-
per’s demarcation has been used by some to elevate science, to accord 
it a status transcending other fields.  Among the ironies of such a 
move is that Popper himself did not believe that science needed to be 
so mythologized.  Instead, he embraced falsificationism with a broader 
goal in mind:  to solve Hume’s famous problem of induction.79
Falsificationism is a rejoinder to ambitions of verifiability:  the no-
tion that a scientific theory can ever be considered “confirmed.”  Pop-
per’s critique of verifiability is integral to his vision of science, but the 
critique rarely comes up in legal discussions of his writings.  For Pop-
per, one can never truly verify a theory.  This does not perplex scien-
tists because verification is not, in Popper’s account, what science 
shoots for.  Science is ultimately characterized by repeated attempts to 
use observations to refute theories, rather than to confirm them.80  We 
can never be certain, argued Popper, that a theory is true.81  In a fa-
mous example often credited to Hume, even after a life spent as an 
ornithologist, one cannot say that all swans are white.  The most one 
77 See, e.g., Imre Lakatos, Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Pro-
grammes, in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 91, 93 (Imre Lakatos & Alan 
Musgrave eds., 1970). 
78 A troubling feature of legal scholarship is that wildly inconsistent views of sci-
ence dominate different camps of the academy.  Justice Blackmun’s Daubert opinion 
famously borrowed Popperian notions of falsifiability as a standard for the admissibility 
of scientific evidence.  See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.  Yet Popper’s core insights are no-
where to be found in the contemporary intellectual property jurisprudence.  Such rifts 
do of course exist in other fields, but they generally emerge from genuine, informed 
disagreements (for instance, about whether string theory is any less valid because ele-
ments of the theory may or may not be falsifiable).  It is hard to imagine why different 
legal fields (evidence versus patent law, in this case) should disagree about the epis-
temic content of science. 
79 See generally DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
(Eric Steinberg ed., 1977). 
80 See GODFREY-SMITH, supra note 63, at 235 (defining Popper’s falsificationism as 
the idea “that a theory is scientific if it has the potential to be refuted by some possible 
observation”); see also KARL R. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH 
OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE (1963); KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOV-
ERY ch. 4 (1959) (discussing and defining the condition of falsifiability). 
81 See GODFREY-SMITH, supra note 63, at 59 (“The harder question is whether or 
not we can be reasonable in increasing our confidence in the truth of a theory when it 
passes observational tests.  Popper said no.  The logical empiricists and most other phi-
losophers of science say yes.”). 
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can conclude is that not all swans are black.  This was Popper’s solu-
tion to the so-called problem of induction.  The best we can say about 
a theory is that it has not yet been shown to be wrong—that it has not 
been falsified but can be falsified.
Contrast this view with the law of nature metaphysics.  Where falsifi-
cationism views successful theories as falsifiable but not yet falsified, le-
gal metaphysics construes them as mirrors of nature.  Where the former 
sees the work of scientists as incessantly challenging accepted theories, 
the latter sees this work as confirming a static reality.  In this way, both 
the rhetoric and gist of Popperian falsificationism runs counter to the 
core vocabulary and content of the law of nature exception. 
I have briefly introduced Popperian falsificationism and American 
pragmatism as exemplars.  These views do not come close to exhaust-
ing the visions of truth in and of science propounded in the past cen-
tury.  Perhaps we, the practitioners of a more grounded guild, do not 
even care what philosophers or historians of science have to say about 
science.  What use do patent attorneys have with such abstract and ar-
cane disputes?  Perhaps it is better to simply assume the truth of theo-
ries in order to draw the boundaries around patentable subject matter 
that are so essential to sustaining a viable patent regime.  And yet, 
even if some scientific discoveries do rise to the level of Truth—
assuming we could ever know when they did so and could correctly 
identify which ones—that is a far cry from saying that all basic discov-
eries, scientific theories, and abstract ideas are somehow laws of na-
ture.82  A point so theoretical seemingly has little relevance for patent 
law.  Yet the obscure disputes of the philosophy of science have been 
made relevant by the metaphysics of patent law, a metaphysics that, as 
we have seen, is foundational to doctrines of patentable subject mat-
ter.  In this arena of jurisprudence, law controls not just practice but 
also contested theory, even if abstract questions of reality otherwise 
play little to no role in patent law. 
As discussed in the next subsection, other disciplines give us fur-
ther reasons to be skeptical of the approach to science underlying the 
law of nature exception.  The history of science too, it turns out, is 
characterized less by rigid, unchanging beliefs than by theories and 
ideas developing over time. 
82 We classify a huge variety of things as “discoveries”—from a previously unidenti-
fied beetle or moon of Jupiter to a new account of how gravity works.  It is probably 
misleading to group all “discoveries” into one bucket, as if they were held together by a 
common epistemic or ontological thread.  It is nearly as grave an error to divide scien-
tific products into distinctive buckets.  One error, of course, does not excuse another. 
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2.  Science in History 
One need not commit to a radical theory of what science is to ac-
cept that perhaps the most enduring, even universal, facet of scientific 
theories is their tendency to change.  Regardless of how we describe 
science, the notion that theories, ideas, and abstract principles evolve, 
that they are modified and replaced over time—and with them our 
understanding of natural phenomena—is a commonplace for scien-
tific researchers, historians, and sociologists alike.  It is a pattern upon 
which even Alan Sokal and Bruno Latour might agree.83
Historians have written about science for as long as they have writ-
ten histories, but the modern academic discipline of the history of sci-
ence has attracted interdisciplinary attention in part because of what it 
suggests about science as a historic, and thus human, enterprise.84  I 
do not even attempt to summarize the discipline here, but suffice it to 
say that it paints a subtler and more dynamic picture of the develop-
ment of science than a mere accumulation of static truths or a rank-
ing of great minds.  In this context, two disciplinary themes are 
worth reciting. 
First, the history of science brims with narratives of how scientific 
ideas and commitments—most pointedly, those once held to be core 
truths—have changed over time.  Thomas Kuhn is the historian most 
associated with this insight,85 but he is by no stretch alone in advanc-
ing it.  Popper and the pragmatists presumed the point; arch-
positivists would be loath to disagree.86  Even the paradigmatic “laws of 
83 Alan Sokal and Bruno Latour have contrasting views of what science does.  La-
tour is a sociologist famous for his excursions into laboratories as a self-described an-
thropologist of science.  See, e.g., BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY 
LIFE: THE CONSTRUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC FACTS (1979) (reporting on Latour’s two-year 
study of the practices of scientists at the Salk Institute for Biological Studies).  Sokal, in 
one of the initial volleys of the so-called “science wars,” sent an essay of high-fashioned 
gobbledygook to a prominent sociology of science journal.  See Alan D. Sokal, Trans-
gressing the Boundaries:  Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity, SOC.
TEXT, Spring/Summer 1996, at 217.  To his astonishment, the piece was published as a 
cover article, leading him to write a tell-all ridiculing the journal and its discipline.  See
ALAN SOKAL & JEAN BRICMONT, FASHIONABLE NONSENSE: POSTMODERN INTELLECTU-
ALS’ ABUSE OF SCIENCE (1998). 
84 See generally History of Sci. Soc’y, Guide to the History of Science, http:// 
www.hssonline.org/guide (last visited Apr. 15, 2009) (cataloguing “people, institutions, 
organizations, and publications pursuing science history”).
85 See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). 
86 Indeed, Kuhn was approached to write The Structure by positivists, who did not 
consider his account of science to be any sort of mortal threat to their worldview.  See
STEVE FULLER, THOMAS KUHN: A PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY FOR OUR TIMES 285-86 
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nature” in patent jurisprudence—Einstein’s and Newton’s theories—
have been modified and illuminated over time.87  The history of sci-
ence cannot tell us whether a standing theory is or is not fact, but it 
can suggest a better way of viewing those theories:  as highly useful, if 
provisional, understandings, likely to be reconsidered and replaced as 
time passes. 
Second, histories of science frequently detail how scientific theo-
ries can be shaped by forces other than slavish empiricism or hard-
and-fast “method.”  Critical scientific debates have at times been in-
formed by political and social structures,88 gender norms,89 aesthetic 
commitments, ideological principles,90 and so on.  This is not to say 
that every scientific theory is a product of such forces, or even that sci-
entific theories are any less valid in some sense when they are.  But 
such observations do suggest that the history of science has not been a 
teleological march to the drumbeat of empirics.  If there is an ambi-
tious conclusion to be extracted from this observation, it may come 
from the insistence of historians and sociologists that science is a hu-
man endeavor—that theories and abstract ideas are as much human 
tools or confabulations as are hammers and widgets. 
3.  Reconsidering Laws of Nature 
Law is a practical and frequently derivative discipline, an engi-
neering of the humanities.  Like “industry,” as imagined at that grand 
museum in Chicago, law takes innovations, ideas, and principles from 
other fields and applies them to the needs of society.  There is, conse-
quently, an inevitable lag between the emergence of insights in eco-
(2000) (“Kuhn’s positivist patron, Rudolf Carnap, . . . complimented Kuhn on having 
provided a historical grounding . . . for his own distinction between questions that are 
decidable within the terms of a given conceptual framework and those that require the 
introduction of extramural factors.”). 
87 For an overview of these developments in modern physics, see PETER GALISON,
EINSTEIN’S CLOCKS, POINCARÉ’S MAPS: EMPIRES OF TIME (2003). 
88 See, e.g., STEVEN SHAPIN & SIMON SCHAFFER, LEVIATHAN AND THE AIR PUMP:
HOBBES, BOYLE, AND THE EXPERIMENTAL LIFE 332 (1985) (arguing that “the history of 
science occupies the same terrain as the history of politics”). 
89 See, e.g., KATHARINE PARK, SECRETS OF WOMEN: GENDER, GENERATION, AND 
THE ORIGINS OF HUMAN DISSECTION 37 (2006) (arguing that a fascination with “se-
crets of women” in medieval and Renaissance Italy “played a central role in the his-
tory of anatomy”). 
90 See, e.g., STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN (rev. ed. 1996) (chal-
lenging biological determinism’s explanations of the differences between races, 
classes, sexes, and other groups). 
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nomics, physics, history, ethics, or biology and their fixation into the 
legal literature.  There is also a confounding, if quite intentional, iner-
tia to the law—best embodied, perhaps, by adherence to stare decisis 
and precedent—that discourages quick appropriation of new extra-
disciplinary ideas and insights and instead favors an incremental 
crawl.91  Further, law suffers from chronic translational errors as these 
ideas and insights are integrated into legal scholarship (though the 
frequency of such errors is, of course, a contentious topic).92  This 
confluence of features—application, lag, inertia, and translation—has 
almost certainly contributed to the current state of patent jurispru-
dence.  In the case of the law of nature exception, it has sustained a 
principle unhinged to the practice and wisdom of other disciplines. 
This raises the question, if law were to treat discoveries as some-
thing other than laws of nature, what might its account look like?  We 
would want foremost to avoid replacing one categorization error with 
another.  There is great variety in the class of insights that we call “dis-
coveries.”  Drawing artificial and suspect lines between different types 
of scientific products is no better or worse than artificially compress-
ing everything that scientists produce into the unitary and undifferen-
tiated category of “discovery.”  Such a move would be incongruous 
with the literature we have just explored.  John Dewey, as one exam-
ple, went so far as to argue that certain types of discoveries are actually 
quite common and recurring:  schoolchildren make discoveries daily, 
though these tend to reflect insights with which the rest of us have 
been long familiar.93
Bearing this caution in mind, the contours of a solution may 
emerge from the material above.  Discoveries, laws of nature, and ab-
stract principles may all be viewed as provisional tools for answering 
91 See Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1018 
(1996) (arguing that stare decisis constrains judges who may otherwise seek to fully 
align the law with their own policy preferences); Victor E. Schwartz et al., Toward Neu-
tral Principles of Stare Decisis in Tort Law, 58 S.C. L. REV. 317, 319 (2006) (“For more than 
two hundred years, courts in the United States have developed tort law through com-
mon law judicial decisions.  This process has an important guardian:  the doctrine of 
stare decisis.  Stare decisis enhances the stability and predictability of tort law by ensur-
ing that change is gradual.”). 
92 Richard Posner argues that this effect of interdisciplinary scholarship is magni-
fied by both the lack of a peer-review process in most American law reviews and the 
fact that legal scholarship often draws heavily from fields outside of law.  Richard A. 
Posner, Against the Law Reviews, LEGAL AFF., Nov.–Dec. 2004, at 57.
93 JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 354 (1916) (outlining a theory of 
individual discovery in education turning both on a student’s discovering the meaning 
of a concept and the “freshness” with which the student reached that realization). 
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questions that we have about the world around us.  Whether theories 
are actually true, or are somehow extractions of nature, is a wholly 
separate and incidental inquiry.  Their relevant characteristic would 
be their functionality:  their ability to answer questions that we want 
answered and to provide solutions to technical and cosmological di-
lemmas of genuine concern.  They would be considered tools like any 
other, though perhaps less tangible tools than, say, hammers or wid-
gets (but no less tangible than mathematical algorithms).  This formu-
lation may not appeal to every philosopher of science, and it would 
certainly fly in the face of standing patent jurisprudence, but as a 
common-sense approach to what it is that scientists do and to how we 
think about science, it holds many advantages over law of nature meta-
physics.
The Supreme Court has already suggested that theories and ideas 
can be viewed as tools for the purposes of patent doctrine.  A particu-
larly telling instance is the Court’s opinion in Gottschalk v. Benson.94
Quoting Le Roy v. Tatham’s brute characterization of a principle as an 
“original cause,”95 the majority opinion continued, “Phenomena of 
nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intel-
lectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of sci-
entific and technological work.”96  Here, the Court was alluding to the 
dangers of granting a monopoly on a critical concept that is essential 
for moving science forward.  But in so doing, the Court affirmed that 
the core feature of principles in scientific research is not their alleged 
status as “motives” or “original causes,” but rather their functionality 
as tools of a trade (in this case, the trade of scientific research).  Just 
like any other tools—including those to which we grant patents—
scientific principles serve concrete purposes but may break down or 
become obsolete over time.  We replace them when needed.  The 
same, of course, should hold for outdated legal principles. 
4.  An Unsustainable Principle 
The law of nature exception—partitioning research products into 
boxes based on their hypothetical relationship to a hypothetical Truth 
in nature—is an anachronism of scientific theory and practice.  A 
more sensible approach to discoveries would be to take stock of the 
insights of scientists and the fields—particularly history, sociology, and 
94 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
95 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1853). 
96 Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67. 
2202 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 2175
philosophy—that study the endeavor of science.  Such a view has long 
held valence in the law, but it has rarely been embraced or articulated 
in full.  Perhaps that is because of the practical difficulties of fashion-
ing an intellectual property regime capable of recognizing rights to 
fundamental discoveries.97  This is the topic to which we now turn. 
II. OBJECTIONS TO A SCIENTIFIC PROPERTY RIGHT
Critiques of law of nature metaphysics are nothing new.  They 
qualify as banalities in other disciplines, a yawn for scientists and intel-
lectual historians.  Yet law has not always been so deeply anomalous.  
Modern patentable-subject-matter jurisprudence obscures the pedi-
gree of such objections.  This legacy has been all but forgotten, alter-
nately lost and discarded in legal circles.  Let us briefly revisit it as a 
frame for the practical challenges that have been raised against pro-
posals for a scientific property right.98
A.  Post-War Context 
The heyday of the movement for a “scientific property” right oc-
curred after World War I, an era of displacement and reconstruc-
tion.99  In this milieu, scientific researchers with fixed incomes from 
European institutes and foundations found themselves impoverished 
and unprotected during a period of crippling inflation.100  Hungry in-
tellects bristled at the worldly successes—or, at least, nonimpoverished 
status—of their colleagues in industry and the written arts, and ques-
tioned the justice of an intellectual property regime that fostered 
haves and have-nots by differentially apportioning rights to different 
sorts of innovations.  “While authors enjoyed copyright and inventors 
97 Fashioning such a regime is not the only alternative in play.  Other solutions to 
patent law’s problem of untenable demarcation may include doing away with monop-
oly rents altogether or simply drawing more sustainable lines between categories of 
research products. 
98 The most comprehensive account of this history is 3 STEPHEN P. LADAS, PAT-
ENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS §§ 1005-1027 (1975).  Though other sources 
have retold Ladas’s account, his material remains the most exhaustive of the available 
published narratives, and so is the one that I will reference most frequently in the 
pages that follow. 
99 See, e.g., Merges, supra note 42, at 152-53 (tracing the movement’s roots to post–
World War I France). 
100 See Thomas R. Ilosvay, Scientific Property, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 178, 180-81 (1953) 
(“In 1919, when the scientists, mostly employed by foundations and with fixed in-
comes, were seriously affected by the fall of the German and French currencies, the 
topic [of a scientific property right] attracted renewed attention.”). 
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could obtain patents,” explained Stephen Ladas in the definitive legal 
history of this movement, “scientists and, generally, persons making 
scientific discoveries could claim no economic benefits from the in-
dustrial progress based on these discoveries.”101  It was a cruel and 
seemingly inexplicable irony that great scientific innovators remained 
“in poverty while others were enriched by using their creative work.”102
Few, if any, advocates of a scientific property right imagined fold-
ing discoveries into existing patent monopoly systems.  They were as 
aware as commentators today of the intuitive and normative objec-
tions to granting monopolies on basic knowledge.  The vast majority 
of advocates proposed reforms that may not have been ultimately suc-
cessful, but were certainly not naïve. 
Most proposals involved granting either royalty awards or direct 
compensation for worthy insights.  For instance, one advocate pro-
posed a tiered system granting either a percentage claim on royalties 
for inventions based on a discovery or a “patent of principle” provid-
ing a right to grant compulsory licenses to use a discovery.103  Others 
envisioned a scientific property right along the lines of “a right of au-
thor” in artistic works, which would be granted upon “sufficient publi-
cation.”104  This right amounted to a royalty determined either by the 
interested parties or, failing that, the courts.  Another version of this 
proposal suggested a royalty “on the money value which [a] discovery 
was likely to acquire by means of its practical application and its indus-
trial utilization, within a specified period of time.”105  This right was to 
last for a period roughly akin to literary or artistic copyrights.  Other 
advocates envisioned centralized funds—sponsored by the state or by 
industries profiting from discoveries—that would distribute financial 
101 3 LADAS, supra note 98, § 1005. 
102 Id.
103 See id. § 1006 (discussing the proposal of Professor J. Barthélemy). 
104 See id. § 1008 (discussing the proposal of the Confédération des Travailleurs 
Intellectuels). 
105 Report on Scientific Property, League of Nations Doc. A.38 1923 XII § 13(II) 
(1923) (submitted by Sen. F. Ruffini). 
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awards to discoverers.106  These funds would pay out years after a dis-
covery to accurately estimate its actual value over time.107
Arguments for a so-called “scientific property right” were styled, in 
the fashion of the time, to echo familiar natural rights rhetoric.  But 
they were based on that most elemental principle of justice:  treating 
likes alike.  Commentators saw grave injustice in extending property 
rights to one class of scientific research products but not another.  For 
instance, one of the central intellects of the reform movement—the 
French academic J. Barthélemy—argued, in Ladas’s words, that “if a 
person, by his intellectual activity, has made possible benefits which 
otherwise would be impossible, justice requires that he obtain a share 
in these benefits.”108  This theme was reiterated by Senator Ruffini of 
Italy, who “rel[ied] unhesitatingly and without scruple upon the 
common feeling of justice, that profound and infallible feeling which 
tells us that there is a wrong which must be righted.”109  Such argu-
ments found currency among American jurists as well.  The opinion 
in Katz v. Horni Signal Manufacturing Corp., for instance, saw irony in 
denying patent protection to great scientific minds who articulate new 
discoveries while protecting the works of “those lesser geniuses who 
put such discoveries to practical use.”110
To complement their arguments about comparative justice, the 
post-War movement for a scientific property right questioned, too, the 
underlying logic and content of divisions between types of research 
products.  The doctrinal arguments that attempted to categorically 
distinguish inventions from discoveries often alluded to the “character 
of creations”—a character attributed to inventions and artistic works 
but found lacking in discoveries and scientific conceptions.111  Such 
differences—alternately described as “the element of creation” or 
“creative elements” or “the character of true creation”—bear more 
106 3 LADAS, supra note 98, § 1015.  Such a system is not dissimilar from the man-
ner in which many grant-giving institutions and political bodies treat research today.  
State commissions frequently dole out awards for meaningful scientific contributions 
or otherwise base research grants to scientists on their track record of scientific innova-
tion and insight.  See infra subsection III.B.1. 
107 I will briefly revisit these championed reforms—reforms that ultimately sput-
tered out as the post-War economic crisis attenuated—in the next Section.  What bears 
mention at present are the analytical contentions that propelled the movement forward. 
108 3 LADAS, supra note 98, § 1006. 
109 Report on Scientific Property, supra note 105, § 6. 
110 145 F.2d 961, 961 (2d Cir. 1944). 
111 See 3 LADAS, supra note 98, § 1011 (summarizing and commenting on Ruffini’s 
survey of the field). 
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than a passing resemblance to the language and motifs of standing 
patent doctrines.  Unsurprisingly, Ruffini’s survey found them “domi-
nated by . . . the crudest utilitarianism, empiricism unhappily dis-
guised in scientific nebulosity, and, finally, the most disconcerting 
arbitrariness.”112
Ruffini also addressed familiar, general objections to granting 
property rights to discoveries.  These objections included the difficul-
ties of identifying a lone discoverer, given the cooperative context in 
which discoveries often occur, prospective roadblocks created by mo-
nopoly power over critical insights, and alleged excess of attaching 
economic incentives to that which would inevitably be produced.  Ruf-
fini easily dismissed these as quibbles, noting that they were function-
ally equivalent to familiar, and long-dismissed, objections to property 
rights for authors and inventors raised at other points in history.113
Even if, as some argued, “a scientific idea was in the air”—a meta-
physical assumption that we see today in discussions of the law of nature 
exception—“it was caught by someone and revealed to the public.  In 
this respect inventions are in no way different from discoveries.”114
In this post-War period, several organizations, ranging from 
France’s Confédération des Travailleurs Intellectuels115 to the Com-
mittee on Intellectual Cooperation of the League of Nations, emerged 
with proposals for a scientific property right.116  We should not under-
estimate the sophistication and creativity of this movement:  the scope 
and originality of its reform proposals remain unmatched by any con-
temporary discussion of the topic.  Ultimately, the movement petered 
out not due to a deficit of persuasive advocates or intellectual fire-
power, but rather because of a changed economic climate in Europe 
and strategic errors among the movement’s leaders.117  Simply, the 
112 Report on Scientific Property, supra note 105, § 6, quoted in 3 LADAS, supra note 98, 
§ 1011. 
113 Id.; see also 3 LADAS, supra note 98, § 1011. 
114 3 LADAS, supra note 98, § 1017. 
115 See id. § 1008. 
116 See id. § 1019; Report on Scientific Property, supra note 105. 
117 Ladas writes that 
the whole movement rested on a political or pragmatic approach to the rec-
ognition of the value of the work of scientists in scientific or technological 
progress but not on a clear understanding of the relationships involved and of 
the scheme of interests and claims to be recognized, reconciled, and satisfied. 
3 LADAS, supra note 98, § 1021; see also Stojan Pretnar, Contemporary Problems of the Rights 
of the Authors of Scientific Discoveries, 1 INDUS. PROP. 286, 297 (1962) (attributing the 
failure of the movement to proposals that “aimed too high”). 
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drive for reform proved largely conditional on the social and financial 
needs of scientists.  As their lot improved during the interwar period, 
the movement lost its urgency.118
Though the movement for a scientific property right largely dissi-
pated in Western Europe by 1930, similar arguments have since sur-
faced intermittently in the United States.  In that same year, North-
western University’s Linthicum Foundation published a study by 
Professor Hamson entitled Patent Rights for Scientific Discoveries,119 argu-
ing for just such a right.120  By and large, Hamson’s argument went 
nowhere, evincing no significant changes to, or sustained discussion 
within, American law.  A similar fate befell a 1971 report by the 
American Bar Association’s Committee on Patent System Policy Plan-
ning, which tentatively suggested an “extension of intellectual prop-
erty protection to scientific discoveries.”121
These ideas continue to re-emerge every so often:  a report by the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) in one decade,122 one by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) in another.123  Most recently, 
the Nobel Prize–winning economist Joseph Stiglitz proposed creating 
“science prizes” for basic medical research to replace the patent mo-
nopolies that currently drive profitability—and, in Stiglitz’s view, du-
bious research priorities and pricing models—in the pharmaceutical 
industry.124  Strikingly, throughout most of the mid–twentieth century, 
118 In France, however, scientific groups continued to discuss the question, even-
tually leading to the creation of the Medal of Scientific Research.  3 LADAS, supra note 
98, § 1021. 
119 C.J. HAMSON, PATENT RIGHTS FOR SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES (1930). 
120 3 LADAS, supra note 98, § 1022. 
121 H. Hume Mathews, Report of Committee No. 108:  Patent System Policy Planning,
1971 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT L. REP. 105, 108. 
122 See LADAS, supra note 98, § 1023 (describing UNESCO’s canvassing of member 
states’ views on expanding intellectual property protection and appointment of a 
committee to study potential expansion). 
123 The OECD prepared a report in 1960, arguing that “it is no longer possible to 
consider fundamental research as completely isolated from the goals and purposes of a 
society or industry,” and that “the manner of bringing new knowledge into practical 
use may well be altering.”  Id. § 1024. 
124 See Joseph Stiglitz, A Better Way to Crack It, NEW SCIENTIST, Sept. 16, 2006, at 20 
(“A prize fund for medical research would be one alternative [to patents]. . . . It would 
provide strong incentives for research but without the inefficiencies associated with 
monopolisation.”). 
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the topic received the most sustained attention in socialist states, in 
which private property was ideological anathema.125
B.  Objections to a Scientific Property Right:  An Impractical Right 
Most critiques of a scientific property right have challenged its 
plausibility and applicability, rather than attempting to defend the 
metaphysical distinctions of our intellectual property system.  The 
presumption that we have no viable alternative to the present system 
has deeply informed the debate over a scientific property right, per-
petuating the distinction between natural principles and man-made 
products beyond its usefulness. 
We have surveyed the reforms championed by movements for a 
scientific property right.  By and large, these proposals involved licens-
ing schemes or compensatory awards drawn from a centralized fund.  
Merges has identified four broad objections to these proposals, objec-
tions that have arisen time and again over the last century: 
First, it is very often difficult to trace the scientific origins of a particular 
industrial application.  Second, there is a significant lag time between 
the disclosure of a scientific discovery and the development of the first 
application . . . . Third, very often it can be assumed that a scientific dis-
closure will be missed by industrialists; they will thus end up paying roy-
alties for a scientific discovery which in fact was not relied upon in creat-
ing their industrial application.  And finally, the very significant burdens 
on scientific communication that a system of property rights would cre-
ate represent perhaps the most severe problem.
126
Beyond these barriers, Merges has articulated a fifth objection:  
such a right would be gratuitous.127  The presumption is that scientific 
research has and will continue to thrive without property rights pro-
tection.  Thus, extending monopoly rents on research products would 
almost certainly prove inefficient.  “On this view,” Merges explains, 
“granting patents for discoveries that scientists would have made anyway
125 See LADAS, supra note 98, § 1025.  Czechoslovakia helped spur this movement by 
recommending a form of eminent domain for discoveries, with both inventors and dis-
coverers transferring their rights to the state in “exchange for a monetary remunera-
tion calculated on the saving in production costs brought about by the invention.”  Id.
§ 1025, at 1876.  These governments, writes Ladas, “were naturally led to recognize and 
grant a remuneration for scientific discoveries because of their indirect effect on pro-
duction through the inventions based on them.”  Id.
126 Merges, supra note 42, at 154. 
127 Id. at 155. 
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would be socially wasteful.”128  Judge Jerome Frank is the jurist most 
frequently identified with this position,129 having argued in Katz v. 
Horni Signal Manufacturing Corp. that 
[e]poch-making “discoveries” of “mere” general scientific “laws,” without 
more, cannot be patented.  So the great “discoveries” of Newton or 
Faraday could not have been rewarded with such a grant of monopoly.  
Interestingly enough, apparently many scientists like Faraday care little 
for monetary rewards; generally the motives of such outstanding gen-
iuses are not pecuniary.  Perhaps (although no one really knows), the 
same cannot be said of those lesser geniuses who put such discoveries to 
practical use.
130
These objections can be further refined into two broad classes.  The 
first relates to the presumed impracticality of schemes establishing a 
scientific property right.  The second involves normative concerns 
about whether such a right is necessary and frets about its disruptive 
influence on basic research. 
Given the many forms that a scientific property right could take, it 
is striking to note the broad contemporary consensus that, in any it-
eration, application and enforcement of such a right would be im-
practicable.  The transaction costs, many argue, would simply be un-
sustainable.131  Among the practical objections to a scientific-property-
rights regime is the difficulty of defining criteria for such rights.  What 
standard would we use to validate a discovery’s status as significant 
enough to merit property protection?  What adjudicative body would 
make that determination? What of codiscovery and the difficulties of 
identifying a lone “discoverer” given the collaborative nature of scien-
tific research? 
These are perplexing questions, as yet unresolved.  And so I do 
not intend to be flippant by pointing out, like Ruffini, that they are 
largely indistinguishable from objections raised against creating pat-
ent, copyright, and trademark regimes throughout legal history.132
128 Id.
129 See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 186 n.45 (“Judge Frank has offered another 
rationale [for the law of nature exception]:  Great scientists are not motivated by pecuni-
ary gain, so the prospect of a patent monopoly will not enhance their productivity.”). 
130 145 F.2d 961, 961 (2d Cir. 1944) (footnote omitted). 
131 See, e.g., Merges, supra note 42, at 155 (“If it is true that property rights are in-
creasingly essential to the research endeavor, it is no less true that these rights will 
bring with them a host of problems.  It is these problems—which I would describe as 
an entire family of new transaction costs—which drive the discussion . . . concerning pol-
icy solutions to the imposition of property rights in science.”). 
132 See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
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Moreover, existing scientific institutions have developed solutions for 
many of these dilemmas.  Peer-reviewed journals manage far better 
than law reviews, and certainly better than patent boards, at distin-
guishing critical from marginal insights.133  Panels of experts associ-
ated with such grand names as Nobel and Fields have over the past 
century identified individuals and discoveries meriting unique distinc-
tion.134  Indeed, much of the organizational structure and culture of 
contemporary science—from tenure committees at universities to 
grant reviewers at the National Institutes of Health (NIH)—is dedi-
cated to addressing precisely these questions.135
Skeptics also raise difficult questions about enforcing a scientific 
property right and making it meaningful.  Critics and proponents 
alike have worried about estimating the value of discoveries in award 
and licensing schemes.  The goal of such schemes is to compensate 
discoverers fairly and efficiently:  that is, neither to overcompensate 
and chill further research, nor to undercompensate and create mar-
ket distortions (though undercompensating seems preferable to fail-
ing to compensate at all).  This difficulty is especially pronounced 
when a discovery’s significance and range of applications becomes 
clear only years after the initial insight.136  In a similar vein, critics 
voice concerns about over- and underenforcement.137  Would a flurry 
of suits over alleged infractions paralyze the courts?  How could we 
possibly know when industry, or really anyone for that matter, applies 
a basic insight?  Enforcement in such conditions could become a 
nightmare.
Barthélemy, the French champion of a scientific property right, 
dismissed such concerns as ultimately inconsequential, arguing, in 
Ruffini’s words, that “complications and progress necessarily go hand-
133 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 92. 
134 Indeed, the most common critique of these committees is not that they have got-
ten things wrong—either in associating certain people and not others with celebrated 
innovations or in choosing certain innovations for distinction—but rather that many in-
dividuals of great merit (the Prousts and Kafkas) failed to receive fair recognition be-
fore their deaths.  See, e.g., Alex Duval Smith, A Nobel Calling:  100 Years of Controversy,
INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Oct. 14, 2005 (listing “the academy’s astonishing omissions”). 
135 Tenure promotions and grant awards are in principle speculative investments, 
based on the prospective accomplishments of a scientist or lab.  However, the reality is 
that scientists with a proven track record of published work have a smoother path to 
attractive grants and departmental promotions. 
136 For this reason many proposals put forth by advocates in the post-War move-
ment for a scientific property right oriented around retrospective grant awards, as dis-
cussed supra Section II.A. 
137 See, e.g., Merges, supra note 42, at 154-55. 
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in-hand and, consequently, the justice meted out to men of science 
would obviously be more complicated than the brutal injustice of 
which they had hitherto been the noble and uncomplaining vic-
tims.”138  Such idealism holds appeal.  Yet the fact that scientific prop-
erty rights have never been protected in American law—nor in the le-
gal system of any other country139—is a testament to the profound 
conceptual difficulties at play.  There is little reason, however, to pre-
sume them necessarily insurmountable. 
I have already suggested that existing political, legal, and scientific 
institutions have long addressed and often surmounted these practical 
problems.  I will return to this topic in Part IV.  At present, it may be 
worth briefly highlighting several legal solutions already in place.  As 
Burk and Lemley have argued, we need not discard standing property 
rights principles like inherency in conceiving of, and applying, a right 
to scientific property.140  Limitations of this sort were familiar and 
widely accepted by even strident advocates for reform in post-War 
Europe, encapsulated most clearly in Dean Wigmore’s reservation to 
Ruffini’s and Barthélemy’s proposals.141
138 Report on Scientific Property, supra note 105, § 4. 
139 France and several socialist states did, however, seriously flirt with the idea.  See
supra notes 118 & 125. 
140 Burk & Lemley, supra note 35, at 406-08 (arguing that the inherency doctrine 
could do the work of the law of nature exception “by providing a rationale for identify-
ing those modified products of nature that are worthy of patents”). 
141 Wigmore contrasted the discoveries of previous generations, which “consisted 
in discovering principles which explained obvious facts of human life,” with modern 
discoveries,  like radium, which go “beyond the explanation of the obvious practices of 
human activity” and “enable us to enter upon activities which the human mind had 
never been able to contemplate.”  Report on Scientific Progress, supra note 105, annex.  As 
Ladas summarized one of Ruffini’s “guiding principles,” “[t]his new aspect of scientific 
discoveries should lead to recognition of a right of scientists in their creations.  But 
those discoveries of the present day which have the same character as the old ones 
should be clearly distinguished.”  3 LADAS, supra note 98, § 1014.  In other words, ex-
plaining a heretofore mysterious (or misunderstood) mechanism at work in an inven-
tion or industrial product does not create a claim to either.  Explicating “why” is dif-
ferent from empowering to, except, perhaps, in the case of empowering to understand 
why.  That is, a fundamental concept or idea most resembles a tool or invention when 
it is used in labs and other fora of basic scientific research, since professional liveli-
hood and success depend on applying insights qua insights (such as when the theory 
of evolution threw open a whole new set of approaches to studying the world around 
us).  Existing property rights doctrines—such as the experimental-use exception—
shed light on how accessible we would choose to make scientific insights to other re-
searchers.  Yet at some point an experimental-use exception covering an entire area of 
intellectual property becomes something other than an exception:  it becomes a form 
of communism (in the nonpejorative, Mertonian sense) or an uncompensated taking 
(in the pejorative sense). 
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Whether these are satisfying legal responses is a topic for an essay 
more concerned than this one with championing particular reforms.  
My point is different:  even if creating a legal regime to protect scien-
tific property is as impractical and quixotic as some have suggested, 
these pragmatic concerns alone do not transform the epistemic and 
ontological status of discoveries.  Put another way, that we are unable 
to protect a property right does not necessarily make it any less of a 
right, or our lack of protection of it any less troubling.142  This point 
was the focus of the previous Section:  determining whether meta-
physical distinctions between scientific research products that we con-
sider to be intellectual property, and those that we do not, are defen-
sible.  A more difficult challenge in this respect is the one to which we 
now turn:  whether perhaps we fail to protect scientific property rights 
because they are somehow normatively undesirable. 
C.  Objections to a Scientific Property Right:  An Undesirable Right 
There are two common normative objections in law to a scientific 
property right.  Let us address them in turn. 
1.  The (Ir)relevance of Money for the Starving Scientist 
The first objection, identified with Judge Frank, holds that scien-
tists are simply not motivated by crass financial gain.143  “Great” re-
searchers, according to this account, are driven solely by passion to do 
science for science’s sake.  Compensating researchers for their discov-
eries would thus be deeply wasteful. 
It is easy to ridicule this position as presuming that scientists are 
inhuman saints.  Indeed, this is precisely the sort of description a law-
yer who has never spent a day of his life in a lab might make of scien-
tists.  But there is something to it.  As any aspiring Ph.D. will attest, the 
notion that scientific researchers are primarily “in it for the money” is 
implausible.  They make far too little of it in their academic posts, and 
their skills are highly marketable in other, far-better-paying industries.  
That said, Judge Frank’s point remains, by and large, silly. 
142 This depends, of course, on how we define the content of property rights; a 
right unprotected and unrecognized by government is arguably no right at all.  Yet if 
we are to classify some products of scientific research as intellectual property, then we 
should want the boundary between what is and is not property to be reasonably coher-
ent.  We should at least try to treat likes alike. 
143 See Katz v. Horni Signal Mfg. Corp., 145 F.2d 961, 961 (2d Cir. 1944). 
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First, Frank’s account, even if once vaguely compelling, is dated.  
As Merges has written, Frank’s assumption is “far less defensible in to-
day’s environment of tight federal budgets.  Regardless of what moti-
vates a scientist, . . . he or she cannot make any progress in the vast ma-
jority of scientific disciplines without a great deal of money.”144
Scientists frequently require absurdly expensive equipment to do their 
research, equipment that they must incessantly upgrade and replace.  
Research also demands a vast array of resources and materials and in-
volves subsidizing graduate students’ protracted, expensive educa-
tions.  All of these things require large sums of money, burdening re-
searchers at every turn with grant applications to a baffling array of 
idiosyncratic funding bodies.  The notion that financial support from 
a scientific property right would somehow be gratuitous is thus woe-
fully misguided.145
Yet even if scientists are altruistic übermenschen, less motivated by 
financial incentives than are lowly nonscientists (particularly inven-
tors), that is a far cry from saying that financial considerations have no
impact whatsoever at the margins.  Why, after all, does a prospective 
graduate student choose to pursue her education at one school rather 
than another?  Certainly the faculty makes a difference, as does prox-
imity to family, the academic environment, the prestige of the degree, 
and even the quality of the school gymnasium.  But financial consid-
erations—in the form of student aid and scholarships, access to spe-
cialized equipment and resources, financial support for research, 
compensation for teaching, and so forth—are absolutely critical.  The 
same holds for researchers pursuing academic appointments. 
So too with the research projects that scientists pursue.  A re-
searcher may want desperately to study a particular scientific issue.  
She may even believe that she has an approach capable of shaking the 
field, assuring her tenure and a constellation of other glories.  But 
without sufficient funding or access to key resources and equipment 
(or, at the very least, the potential to recoup her investments), her 
suspicion will remain unexplored. 
Mundane salary matters are similarly relevant, despite what law-
yers want to believe about scientists.  Grade-school economics tells us 
144 Merges, supra note 42, at 155. 
145 Merges writes, “Far from being redundant—an unnecessary reward, heaped on 
a researcher who would have done the same work without it—[property rights] may 
well be essential.”  Id.  He also observes that “since adequate funding is essential to sci-
ence, society will not receive the results of scientific research without either extensive 
public support or some other revenue source [like monopoly rents].”  Id.
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that small changes in projected income can make a difference, how-
ever marginal, in career decisions.  Even if we believe this to be less 
true (or consider the effect to be smaller) for scientists, we would be 
fooling ourselves and committing a Frankian mischaracterization of 
our peers across campus to assume that differences of, say, $20,000, 
$40,000, or—for associate professors who could take jobs in consult-
ing or the pharmaceutical industry—$100,000, are of no moment. 
2.  Norms of Science Under Assault 
A more perplexing critique of scientific property rights builds on 
a view of science that enjoys great currency in legal circles, and so 
holds more than a few parallels to law of nature metaphysics.  The 
stance hinges on so-called “norms of science,” as envisioned and ar-
ticulated by the sociologist of science Robert Merton in the 1940s.146
Recitations of this critique in the legal academy tend to echo an influ-
ential article on the topic by Rebecca Eisenberg in the late 1980s.147
Eisenberg largely introduced Merton’s writings to legal scholarship148
at a moment when the line between basic and applied research in bio-
technology was becoming blurred by vexed courts.149
The account runs roughly as follows.  Merton identified four in-
terrelated norms of science, reinforced by the academy’s reward struc-
ture:  universalism, communism, disinterestedness, and organized 
146 See generally ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE (Norman W. Storer 
ed., 1973) [hereinafter MERTON, SOCIOLOGY] (collecting Merton’s earlier writings). 
147 See Eisenberg, supra note 1. 
148 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science:  Exclusive Rights 
and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1046-51 (1989) (discussing Merton’s 
work); Peter Yun-hyoung Lee, Inverting the Logic of Scientific Discovery:  Applying Common 
Law Patentable Subject Matter Doctrine to Constrain Patents on Biotechnology Research Tools,
19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 79, 84-85 (2005) (“Eisenberg has described a model where sci-
entists freely exchange findings while university lawyers haggle over rights and licens-
ing agreements.”).  But see Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research:  Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 79 n.12 (1999) (criticizing 
Eisenberg’s and Merges’s characterizations of scientific research norms as outdated).  
Legal academics have repeatedly echoed Eisenberg’s take on Merton.  While this is a 
testament to the quality of her essay, it is also worrying.  Merton is not the only soci-
ologist of science to have written about “norms of science,” and more recent scholar-
ship has complicated his account.  Yet in surveying the legal literature, one would get 
the impression that Merton is the first and last word in the sociology of science.  That 
is simply not the case.  Merton is, instead, the scholar who has been most written about 
by legal academics, and so is easiest for legal academics to write about.  We have seen 
such intradisciplinary inertia before:  in our discussion of law of nature metaphysics. 
149 See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text. 
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skepticism.150  The communism norm has attracted the most sustained 
attention from patent scholars.  Lawyers commonly contrast commu-
nism in research—encouraging an unimpeded flow of information 
between scientists, and unbridled collaboration among them—with 
the ostensibly monopolistic, individual-rights-based ethos of intellec-
tual property law.  Property rights, in this view, disrupt the “natural” 
ebb and flow of scientific research and collaboration, impeding scien-
tific progress more generally.151
One can question whether Merton’s claims are descriptively valid; 
many argue that they have little to do with entire fields of scientific re-
search.152  But assume his positivistic account was more or less cor-
rect.153  Even if we accept that basic research hinges on openness and 
150 See Robert K. Merton, A Note on Science and Democracy, J. LEGAL & POL. SOC., Oct. 
1942, at 115, reprinted as The Normative Structure of Science, in MERTON, SOCIOLOGY, supra
note 146, at 267, 270-78 [hereinafter Merton, Science and Democracy] (describing four 
norms of science); see also Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 182-83 (same).  Merton’s famous 
paper on the reward system in science is Robert K. Merton, Priorities in Scientific Discov-
ery:  A Chapter in the Sociology of Science, 22 AM. SOC. REV. 635 (1957), reprinted in MER-
TON, SOCIOLOGY, supra note 146, at 286.  Merton argued that recognition—receiving 
credit as the first person to come up with an idea—was the essential form of reward in 
science, and so too the dominant property right attached to scientific discoveries.  Id.
at 297-305. 
151 Eisenberg argues that “although there are substantial parallels between [patent 
doctrine and scientific norms], the conjunction [between them] may nonetheless 
cause delay in the dissemination of new knowledge and aggravate inherent conflict 
between the norms and the reward structure of science.”  Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 
180.  However, as both Mark Lemley and Eisenberg have pointed out, property rights 
regimes that require disclosure may actually encourage more openness than alterna-
tives turning on secrecy between competing research groups or corporate interests.  See
id. at 206. 
152 Scientific research can be far more competitive than the word “communism” 
suggests.  Instances of competitive behavior abound and are, in some cases, the stuff of 
legend. See, e.g., JAMES D. WATSON, THE DOUBLE HELIX (1968) (recounting the scien-
tific competition involved in the discovery of DNA).  Only so many grants, academic 
posts, and scientific prizes exist, creating competitive dynamics that complicate Merto-
nian norms.  Legal Mertonians frequently reply that norms do not necessarily describe 
how scientists act, but rather identify what actions the “scientific community” considers to 
be acceptable—they are aspirational ideas rather than practiced realities. 
153 The sociology of science, no less than any other academy, has changed signifi-
cantly since the 1940s and 1950s, but let us again bracket law’s anachronisms for the 
sake of argument.  Peter Godfrey-Smith writes sympathetically that “Merton’s sociology 
is often seen as the ‘old’ style of sociology of science, a style that was superseded nearly 
thirty years ago.  But there are some good ideas here, especially in the treatment of 
rewards.”  GODFREY-SMITH, supra note 63, at 125.  Mertonian sociology of science has 
been largely superseded by the “strong program” of the sociology of science and its 
progeny. See, e.g., LATOUR & WOOLGAR, supra note 83; SHAPIN & SCHAFFER, supra note 
88; see also GODFREY-SMITH, supra note 63, at 125-28 (describing the development of 
the strong program). 
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collaboration—“communism,” in the Mertonian parlance—there is, as 
Merton himself eloquently noted, fierce competition for recognition 
among scientists, particularly for credit in being first to bring a new 
insight to light.154  Merton considered this credit to be a form of prop-
erty, tethered as it often is to grant funding, scientific prizes, and aca-
demic appointments.155  An expanded scientific property right—
covering mandatory licensing, a financial grant, or a shiny medal—
could well increase competition and further discourage openness, 
causing researchers to be even more secretive than they are today.156
Still, this critique assumes that we cannot create a right with rea-
sonable exceptions (such as a broad experimental-use exception) or 
limited transaction costs capable of mimicking the status quo.  It is 
worth asking, with post-War advocates, whether a well-designed rights 
regime could give scientists the same access to ideas and discoveries 
that they currently enjoy in our competitive world of academic posts, 
lucrative grants, and high-stakes publications.  After all, creating ex-
ceptions and taking property for the commons are not unfamiliar mo-
tifs of jurisprudence.157  But a still more basic point can be made about 
law’s relationship to basic research. 
Law has already intervened.  Law’s influence on science has long 
passed the point of some original sin, a juncture that almost certainly 
predates even the ancient Venetian patent statutes.  Scientific 
norms—as well as the scientific academy’s reward systems—have de-
veloped in the shadow of law’s demarcations and their economic con-
sequences.  Legal regimes cannot and do not wholly determine the 
course of the scientific enterprise, but they almost certainly have a 
154 Merton, Science and Democracy, supra note 150, at 286-93. As Godfrey-Smith 
points out, such competition—which can become fierce between research groups and 
particular scientists—runs counter to Merton’s claim that disinterestedness is, in fact, a 
basic norm of scientific research.  GODFREY-SMITH, supra note 63, at 125-28. 
155 Merton, Science and Democracy, supra note 150, at 293-96. 
156 This expansion may already be occurring, as patents are increasingly applied to 
innovations that had once been classed “basic research.” See infra subsection III.B.1.
However, rights regimes may in fact encourage more openness than the alternative.  As 
Lemley has pointed out, “in the commercial world, after all, patents encourage more 
openness than the secrecy regimes that would exist in their absence.”  Letter from 
Mark Lemley to author, supra note 54. 
157 The experimental-use exception has long been in decline and arguably is at a 
nadir in American jurisprudence.  See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 148, at 1019 (“[T]he 
experimental use defense has been frequently raised but rarely sustained.”); Katherine 
J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get?  Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 
WIS. L. REV. 81, 84 (“[R]ecent decisions . . . threaten to shrink the experimental-use ex-
emption to extinction.”).  The same, however, cannot be said for takings jurisprudence. 
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nontrivial impact on it.  Is that not, after all, the very premise of our 
patent system? 
Legal academics speak of scientific norms and basic research as if 
scientists and researchers, rather than the lawmakers and jurists of yes-
teryear, decided what research products should be patentable.  But 
this is rationalization, not history.  The status quo is no natural default 
or ethereal ideal.  Rather, it is a product of particular legal and politi-
cal choices that have been made regarding science, and particular ac-
counts of science that have come to dominate legal thinking over the 
centuries.  Genius inventors, after all, have long enjoyed recognition 
from their peers and been rewarded with grants and professorships, 
all alongside the economic fruits of their patents.158  All of these ele-
ments, we seem to believe, are needed to encourage an “efficient” 
level of invention.  Yet in the same breath, the legal academy asserts 
that savant scientists only need grants, professorships, and the like, for 
their norms made it so!  With Panglossian nerve, lawyers argue that it 
is beside the point that scientists cannot seek the latter.  I argue in the 
next Part that this is very much the point. 
III. DEFAULTS AND INTERVENTIONS: RECONSIDERING
SCIENCE IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
Patent scholars have long wondered what it means to label a pace 
of innovation and invention as “efficient.”159  From the preceding dis-
cussion, we could add several more questions:  What does it mean to 
call a level of innovation in basic research “efficient?”  How could we 
ever know when we have reached a point approaching optimality?  
What is it that individual scientists and inventors “need,” and why do 
we believe their needs do, or should, diverge?  Or, perhaps more pre-
cisely, what are the consequences of extending legal rights to one type 
of scientific research product that we withhold from another?  Since 
158 Indeed, long before modern patent regimes, inventors were often subsidized 
by patrons who saw great practical and social value in their work.  Da Vinci’s reliance 
upon Italian families of wealth and prestige is perhaps the most famous instance of 
such an arrangement.  See, e.g., CHARLES NICHOLL, LEONARDO DA VINCI: FLIGHTS OF 
THE MIND (2004).  Systems of patronage have persevered in a variety of forms over the 
centuries. See generally RICHARD DRAYTON, NATURE’S GOVERNMENT: SCIENCE, IMPERIAL 
BRITAIN, AND THE “IMPROVEMENT” OF THE WORLD (2000); R. FOX ET AL., THE PATRON-
AGE OF SCIENCE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (G. L’E. Turner ed., 1976). 
159 See, e.g., Kimberley A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521, 
1549 (2005) (“Literature on intellectual property rights and patent policy ask [sic] w-
hether the patent system is an effective incentive mechanism for spurring innovation 
and disclosure . . . .”). 
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law does not just reflect how science is done, but can also shape its 
course, what are the foreseeable consequences for which it should ac-
count?  In Part I, I observed that law’s metaphysical distinctions be-
tween natural principles and man’s contrivances were themselves 
deeply unsatisfying contrivances.  In Part II, I surveyed practical and 
qualitative objections to a scientific property right.  We now turn to 
the implications.  Assuming that we can live with law’s tenuous meta-
physics and cannot fathom a workable scientific property rights re-
gime, what are the consequences of intellectual property law’s present 
interventions on the scientific enterprise, in the form of the patent 
system?  If the status quo is not a default but an intervention on an en-
tire field of human inquiry, then what is it that law conjures? 
One consequence explored in the remaining pages of this Article 
involves rethinking the nature and function of government support 
for scientific research and, more broadly, political involvement in the 
scientific enterprise.  Such a perspective may encourage a shift from 
the desultory “largesse/social capital” discourse surrounding govern-
ment support of the sciences to more sustained and serious discussions 
of economic efficiency and just compensation in research science. 
A.  A Default that Is No Default 
It is difficult to prove that law works efficiently in granting patents 
to inventions but not extending similar rights to basic-research prod-
ucts, at least in part because modern American law knows no other 
system of intellectual property.  Perhaps patent law is well founded in 
its presumption that the ambit of patentable-subject-matter jurispru-
dence is efficient—the past few centuries have, after all, witnessed re-
markable technological achievement.  But past experience—the his-
tory of technology in the United States—is ultimately an unsatisfying 
reference point if we are making bold claims about efficiency, which is 
an inherently relative concept.160  Reasoning from history to argue 
that the demarcations of patentable subject matter are somehow op-
timal ultimately reduces to a counterfactual assertion—a Panglossian 
presumption lacking the sorts of reference points that might prove 
160 Efficiency is one of many economic metrics—including, for instance, Pareto 
optimality—that require reference points of comparison to be meaningful.  Before we 
can call something efficient, we must give it some context—efficient for whom and 
compared to what known (or hypothetical) alternative.  See generally AVINASH K. DIXIT,
OPTIMIZATION IN ECONOMIC THEORY (2d ed. 1990). 
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such striking claims of optimality.161  Indeed, there are good reasons 
to believe that law’s demarcation of scientific research products into 
two categories bearing drastically different legal consequences is far 
less than ideal, both economically and socially. 
1.  Science as a Vocation 
Consider a graduate student in the sciences, trying to decide if she 
should devote her career to academic research.  Scientists make pro-
fessional tradeoffs, no less than the rest of us.  Aspiring academics and 
researchers may enter other vocations for reasons of skill, intellectual 
interest, or financial well-being.  The presence of such attractive, lu-
crative alternatives adds an important dimension to discussions about 
the structure of patent law because it adds an important dimension to 
our hypothetical graduate student’s plans for the future. 
We extend monopoly rents to certain types of research products 
to spur greater levels of innovation within that class of products.  But 
what would inventors be doing if that financial spur was not in place?  
We grant patents so inventors will invent more, but as opposed to do-
ing what else? 
We may answer that inventors choose to invent as opposed to be-
coming insurance agents, novelists, or management consultants.  Not 
all inventors, after all, are scientists.  Or we may answer that inventors 
choose to invent as opposed to taking on lower-risk projects, less am-
bitious forays into innovation.  What a dull, listless, underdeveloped 
world of technology we might face without patent protection.162  (So 
goes, at least, the standard view.)  But our graduate student faces 
other choices still:  she may conduct other types of (now relatively less 
profitable) research or go into (now relatively less profitable) fields of 
science—applying and patenting, in short, rather than researching 
and discovering. 
We do not know what a scientific property right would do to the 
allocation of private investment and financing, to the size and scope 
of science departments at universities, to the development of philan-
thropic research institutes, or to the ambitions of grant-giving institu-
161 The legions of scholars currently pressing for reform in patent law represent 
one locus of skepticism towards claims of optimality.  As a matter of necessity, few, if 
any, would argue that our current patent regime is the best of all possible patent re-
gimes. See, e.g., Kesan & Gallo, supra note 44 (using game theory to explain the preva-
lence of incorrectly granted patents in the marketplace). 
162 See supra Section II.A (discussing the conventional rationales for patent protection). 
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tions.163  Nor do we know with any measure of certainty what patent 
rights have done over the decades to apportion such resources within 
the spectrum of applied- and basic-research projects.  But we would be 
fooling ourselves to presume that there has been no effect whatsoever.
These consequences are legally significant and deserve considera-
tion because law bears at least partial responsibility for bringing them 
about.164  There are at least four ways in which intellectual property 
law could apportion rights within the universe of scientific research 
products.  We could extend rights to both applied- and basic-research 
products, to applied but not basic, to basic but not applied, or we 
could be stingy and deny rights to both.  The first and last alternatives 
would blur categorical divisions between classes of scientific products.  
The second and third alternatives would perpetuate divisions on the 
basis of any number of rationales.  (The second, of course, represents 
a rough description of the patent system with which we are most famil-
iar.)  Yet only the last of these four alternatives could possibly be de-
scribed as any sort of nonintervention or default.165
2.  Patents and Distortions 
Patent law does not spur general innovation in science, but rather 
a particular type of innovation in science.  It encourages scientists to 
do some things in lieu of others.  This is no market default.  Patent 
law is, and was never intended to be anything but, a distortion.  Its 
very aim is to differentially price the projects and careers that indi-
163 Some critics have assailed the phenomenon of university patenting for driving 
academics away from basic research and toward applied research.  See, e.g., David C. 
Mowery & Bhaven N. Sampat, University Patents and Patent Policy Debates in the USA, 
1925–1980, 10 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 781, 785-86 (2001) (collecting sources explain-
ing this criticism of university patenting).  Arguably, treating applied- and basic-
research products similarly—rather than exacerbating existing differences by categori-
cally divorcing the two in intellectual property law—could help mitigate the trend. 
164 This theme is commonly reiterated by the British Royal Society for the Encour-
agement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce (RSA) which, like Stiglitz, has argued 
for replacing patent monopolies with research prizes for worthy inventions and discov-
eries.  Writing in the RSA Journal, Kenneth Neil Cukier asks rhetorically, “what is intel-
lectual property, and why is it so controversial?  In essence,” he answers, “it is a fiction 
created by law.  Intellectual property is simply a metaphor for the granting of a ‘prop-
erty right’ on ideas.” Kenneth Neil Cukier, In Defence of Creativity, RSA J., Dec. 2005, at 
18, 19.
165 Even the final alternative would be a stretch, ignoring as it does the broader 
context of a market economy that has already been irrevocably shaped by the regula-
tory structure of our patent regime, the conceptual assumptions behind our intellec-
tual property system, and the ambit of patentable subject matter. 
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viduals and institutions pursue, with a clear aim in mind.  Our patent 
system, we should remember, is instrumental at core—concerned less 
with natural rights principles than with yielding particular social 
ends.166
Even in the absence of patent rights, products of applied research 
would often remain more lucrative, or at least more broadly market-
able, than products of basic research.  Innovative refrigerators, after 
all, hold more commercial potential than, say, groundbreaking equa-
tions in quantum mechanics.  Yet in tying monopoly rights to applied-
research products but not to those of basic research, patent law neces-
sarily exacerbates that difference.  Perhaps the effect is negligible and 
limited to the margins.  But it is an effect no less,167 one that legal 
scholarship has been loathe to acknowledge.168  It is an inevitable facet 
of intellectual property’s demarcation of science—in theory and re-
ward—propounded and sustained by the instruments and common 
law quirks of patent law. 
Of course, this distortion is not untrammeled.  Many actors in our 
political economy indirectly dampen patent law’s distortions in the 
scientific job, grant, and research markets.  For instance, private phi-
lanthropies and endowments, among them the Howard Hughes 
Medical Institute and the Gates Foundation, extend generous support 
for pet areas of research.  Their financial commitments create incen-
tives for basic research that are otherwise un- or underprovided by the 
market alone (particularly in the absence of intellectual property pro-
tection).  Even more significant in impact and sheer financial heft is 
government funding, in the form of NIH grants, professorships at 
public universities, and so forth.  The role of the private sector in 
funding basic research is even greater still, though corporations tend 
to hide the fruits of their basic research from public view.169  (This is a 
reasonably predictable result of placing basic research beyond the 
166 See supra note 16. 
167 Picking up on a theme sounded in decades past by advocates of a scientific 
property right, Nobel Prize–winning economist Joseph Stiglitz has invoked the under-
compensated basic researcher as a paradigmatic instance of positive externality.  
Stiglitz writes that “[t]he outcome of R&D is an example of a positive externality, 
where ideas make others better off, perhaps enabling the production of goods at lower 
cost; however, in research, the originator of the ideas may not be fully compensated.”  
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Global Public Goods and Global Finance:  Does Global Governance Ensure 
that the Global Public Interest Is Served?, in ADVANCING PUBLIC GOODS 149, 151 ( Jean-
Philippe Touffut ed., 2006). 
168 See supra subsection III.A.1. 
169 See EISEMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 18-21. 
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ambit of patentable subject matter.  Private sector actors turn to trade 
secrecy as they have little to gain, and potentially much to lose, from 
sharing such insights with the public; unlike their academic counter-
parts, corporations gain little from academic accolades.170)
To be sure, public debates over funding priorities rarely, if ever, 
cast research funding in distortionary or efficiency terms.  Most often, 
we construe scientific research as largesse and social investment—
which is to say, essentially voluntary and of hypothetical value. 
Regardless of the constellation of reasons inspiring private and 
public actors to support basic research, their support acts as a coun-
terbalance.  It has the effect of realigning incentives in the science 
markets, diminishing the distortions foisted upon those markets by 
law’s wholly voluntary and deeply consequential patent system.  This 
effect offers an arguably novel rationale for maintaining, if not greatly 
expanding, public support for basic research:  mitigating the long-
standing distortions created by legal doctrines that have attached pat-
ent monopolies to some types of research products but not to others.  
Such a rationale does not require that we reconstruct our view of basic 
research to, for instance, define basic research as property or not 
property or even to challenge canons of patentable subject matter.  
The rationale merely demands that we acknowledge the practical ef-
fects of those obscure legalistic canons, the lived consequences of call-
ing some scientific research products property and others nonproperty. 
170 So goes the essential tradeoff of our patent system:  we exchange monopolies 
for public disclosure of new inventions.  See also Eisenberg, supra note 148, at 1028-30 
(discussing the role of patents in promoting disclosure as an alternative to the infor-
mation hoarding of trade-secrecy regimes).  For the private sector, the absence of in-
tellectual property rights attaching to basic-research products may have several impli-
cations.  First, companies will arguably tend to invest relatively less money than they 
otherwise might in basic research.  Second, they have little incentive to share research 
findings with the public.  If and when companies achieve a significant innovation, it 
makes sense for them to keep it secret since there is rarely something to be gained fi-
nancially from sharing it with the public—and their competitors.  This is true both of 
those innovations that have clear commercial uses and of those that do not.  In the 
case of the former, the public at least manages to reap the downstream benefits of an 
innovation in the applied marketplace (even if they are unaware of what they are reap-
ing).  But it is likely, in the case of the latter, that potentially significant innovations (of 
profound academic significance or with unseen implications for other industries) will 
languish in the file cabinets of corporate R&D departments. 
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B.  If Scientific Research Is a Form of Property 
1.  Private Property, Just Compensation 
Scientists are almost certainly driven to pursue knowledge largely 
for its own sake, but accolades—academic awards, prizes, grants, and 
tenure posts—remain highly sought after and are rarely turned 
down.171  They are arguably as important for many scientists as being 
recognized as having priority in discovering a contested principle or 
idea.172  We have already noted that Merton identified priority as a 
form of property, however idiosyncratic it may seem.173  The same 
holds for awards, grants, and tenure appointments.  Public funding is 
not always implicated in these forms of property, but it often plays an 
essential role in fostering and sustaining them. 
For instance, private universities use their increasingly monumen-
tal endowments to sponsor professorships in the sciences, and innu-
merable private organizations dole out awards for researchers whose 
work constitutes particularly striking contributions to a particular field 
or to “science” more generally (the MacArthur Grant and the Nobel 
Prize are two examples among many).  But, as the legal academy 
grudgingly acknowledged in regards to the Solomon Amendment, 
171 Indeed, the “reclusive Russian topologist” Grigory Perelman received much 
unwanted international press after he turned down the Fields Medal and its $13,500 
purse in 2006.  He had earned the recognition for solving Poincaré’s conjecture.  
Perelman’s decision was considered particularly incongruous given that, unlike earlier 
instances of such behavior—for example, Marlon Brando’s turning down an Oscar or 
Jean-Paul Sartre’s turning down the Nobel—he was not driven by any clear political or 
personal agenda.  See George Johnson, The Math Was Complex, the Intentions, Strikingly 
Simple, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2006, § 4 (Week in Review), at 3. 
172 These forms of property are often highly intertwined.  Being recognized as the 
original “discoverer” of an important principle can open the door to tenure, lucrative 
grants, and celebrated awards.  But it is not always a precondition for those distinc-
tions.  Oftentimes, a significant paper—or even several minor papers in secondary 
journals that manage to incrementally push a discipline forward—is enough to bring 
accolades aplenty to a researcher or to earn tenure for a junior faculty member.  Grant 
awards and postdoctoral positions may at times have little to do with prominent past 
outputs—young researchers often enjoy them by virtue of their affiliation with a pre-
eminent researcher or an established lab, rather than because of any particular insight 
they have already contributed to their field.  In many instances, these forms of prop-
erty are prospective grants hedging that a promising young scientist will realize her 
potential at some future moment.  In this sense, priority alone is just one of many forms 
of property (or quasi property) at play in the world of basic scientific research.  Being 
recognized by one’s peers as having priority may certainly make it easier to access these 
resources, but it is not the only pathway. 
173 See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
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such research is nearly always dependent on public funding running 
the gamut from NIH grants to summer science programs to govern-
ment scholarships for graduate students.174
Public funding invariably plays a role in rewarding scientists for 
their efforts (if and when they are rewarded), prospectively encourag-
ing them to devote their careers to research or empowering them to 
take on new projects.  Stanford University may offer a promising 
young biochemist a tenure-track post, but her work could not be sus-
tained without significant public support for her research—regardless 
of whether that support is directly transferred in the form of govern-
ment grants or indirectly apportioned through her university affilia-
tion.  In turn, the Fields Medal may be entirely drawn from private 
funds, but the accomplishments that it recognizes are only rarely 
achieved in the absence of direct or indirect public support for re-
search in math and science.  And, of course, the link between public 
moneys and scientific research is unambiguous at state universities 
and institutions like the NIH or RAND. 
These varieties of public support are often portrayed as voluntary 
largesse, particularly when applied to fields of science—like particle 
physics—that mystify the overwhelming majority of us, or others—like 
NASA’s manned-spaceflight program—for which the public benefit 
can be difficult to articulate.175  Alternately, government support of 
scientific research is construed as a form of investment in social and 
human capital—channeling resources into science education and re-
search for the downstream effects that they have on economic metrics 
174 The importance of public resources for the work of scientists even at private 
universities was highlighted by Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, 
Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006), in which the Supreme Court upheld the Solomon Amend-
ment, 10 U.S.C. § 983 (2006), which conditioned the receipt of federal funding by uni-
versities on their allowing the military to recruit on campus.  It is telling that upon the 
Court’s decision, law schools—including those petitioning on the side of FAIR—
uniformly abdicated to the dictates of the Solomon Amendment, rather than soldier-
ing on with their principles and suffering the ensuing economic consequences.  Given 
the choice between principles and potentially bringing scientific research at their uni-
versities to an immediate halt upon cutoff of federal research funding, law schools had 
little choice at all. 
175 For a well-publicized critique of NASA’s increasingly directionless manned-shuttle 
program, see 1 COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD REPORT 11 (2003), available 
at http://caib.nasa.gov/news/report/pdf/vol1/full/caib_report_volume1.pdf, in which 
the Investigation Board reported that it was “convinced that the management practices 
overseeing the Space Shuttle program were as much a cause of the accident as the 
foam that struck the left wing.” 
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like GDP or political priorities like national defense.176  It may be 
worth considering, however, whether the critical role of public fund-
ing in the progress of science betrays a further underlying function.  
Perhaps grants, research awards, and tenure promotions should not 
merely be viewed as gifts or public largesse or even investments in 
human capital, but rather as another type of expenditure altogether:  
a form of compensation for that which we have long failed to formally 
compensate. 
Courts have consistently construed state takings of private prop-
erty without just compensation or for a nonpublic use as core consti-
tutional concerns.177  The manner in which we reward scientists with 
grants and prizes is today undoubtedly more ad hoc than the careful, 
particularized circumstances in which eminent domain is (supposed 
to be) exercised by states and the federal government.178  Moreover, 
even if we believe that products of basic scientific research deserve 
status as a form of intellectual property, it is not necessarily the state 
176 See, e.g., NAT’L SCI. BD., THE FEDERAL ROLE IN SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING 
GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL EDUCATION (1998), available at http://www.nsf.gov/ 
nsb/documents/1997/nsb97235/nsb97235.pdf (“At the conclusion of World War II in 
1945, Vannevar Bush argued persuasively in his report, Science—the Endless Frontier, that 
the Federal government should continue to support science and engineering research 
and post-secondary education in peacetime and that this investment would contribute 
to national security, economic growth, health, and the quality of life.”). 
177 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 
(2005), brought the contours of the public-use requirement to the fore of academic 
and media debates about the proper scope of the state’s eminent domain powers.  
Governmental appropriations (with commensurate compensation) to make discoveries 
and basic research freely accessible to the public would likely qualify as a valid public 
use if such research products were accorded property rights. 
178 The operative inquiry in takings jurisprudence often relates to the sorts of state 
actions that “effectively destroy” a property right, classically due to physical occupation 
or appropriation of property.  See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-38 (1982) (holding that a permanent physical occupation “ef-
fectively destroys” “the rights ‘to possess, use, and dispose of’” the affected territory 
(quoting United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945))).  In Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, the Supreme Court extended this principle beyond 
physical occupations to “total” destructions of value that are akin to physical appro-
priations.  505 U.S. 1003, 1027-31 (1992).  It would be difficult to argue that govern-
ment neglect of a property right constitutes a physical taking.  In the case of unrealized 
scientific property rights, basic research products and discoveries are often tethered to 
other forms of property and quasi property—such as grants, awards, and tenure 
posts—as well.  As a result, merely transforming an insight into a public good (that is, 
failing to protect it as a form of property) does not eliminate the value of a discovery 
altogether.  Whether this depreciation in value actually can be said to occur—and the 
extent of that supposed depreciation—is a question for economists.  But whether we 
should want to remedy it through mechanisms of law and policy is a question of real 
resonance for lawyers and policymakers. 
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that unfairly appropriates that property.  It is, rather, other scientists, 
researchers, textbooks, inventors, and industries that most frequently 
invoke, apply, and benefit from basic insights and discoveries without 
a second thought.  For these reasons, the sorts of tradeoffs inherent to 
the formulations of takings jurisprudence—between a property right 
of some sort and state appropriation of, and compensation for, it—
may not be immediately apparent.179
If, however, we believe that research products are a form of prop-
erty or that patent law’s distinctions between patentable and unpat-
entable research products are unsatisfying (violating the justice prin-
ciple of treating likes alike), then a tradeoff becomes more apparent.  
From this perspective, when our intellectual property system distin-
guishes patentable “inventions” from unpatentable “discoveries,” it ef-
fectively transforms the latter into a public good.180  This is a familiar 
narrative, but one rarely applied to intellectual property law:  the gov-
ernment, unwilling or unable to protect a property right, simply ig-
nores it or appropriates it for the commons. 
2.  A Takings Perspective 
My aim here is not to squeeze patent law’s approach to basic re-
search into the takings doctrine through some unwieldy legalistic con-
179 However, our current approach to basic research is arguably akin to the stance 
of legal and political institutions toward private property before the fixation of a vi-
brant takings jurisprudence in colonial America.  William Michael Treanor writes that 
[i]n colonial America, government routinely acted in ways that affected pri-
vate property, and the political process determined when compensation was 
due.  No judicially enforceable compensation requirement existed during this 
period.  Even after the establishment of a compensation requirement, it ap-
plied only to interference with physical ownership, and government routinely 
acted in ways that diminished the value of private property without providing 
compensation. 
William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Politi-
cal Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 785 (1995). 
180 Of course, one could argue that no such transformation occurs.  Since argu-
ments for a natural right to property for discoveries and basic research rarely hold 
sway, the act of transformation likely occurs when government attaches monopoly 
rights to inventions—that is, when it makes certain research products patentable.  See
supra Section II.A.  I return, then, to the question of what constitutes a legal default 
and what constitutes a legal intervention.  I presume, here, a default of property pro-
tection.  For better or worse, law has taken the general stance of affording property 
rights to a world of creative products—be they novels, inventions, or trademarks.  Basic 
research products construed to be beyond the patentable pale by the law of nature ex-
ception thus represent a significant departure from the law’s default of property pro-
tection. 
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tortion.  I do, however, propose that we reconsider how we talk about 
grants, tenure posts, and other forms of public funding for the sci-
ences.  Discoveries and basic research create tremendous value for in-
dividuals, industries, and society more broadly.  Yet our intellectual 
property regime prohibits researchers and scientists from extracting 
some of that value through monopoly rents, in marked contrast to its 
long-standing munificence towards inventors.  In light of this favorit-
ism, government funding of basic research can be justified on quite 
different grounds from the popular tropes of political largesse and so-
cial investment that have come to dominate political debates on the 
matter. 
Once we honestly account for the effect that highly artificial intel-
lectual property regimes have on scientific research, at least two inde-
pendent, relatively novel, and arguably compelling reasons arise for 
sustaining—or even increasing—such federal funding.  We can de-
scribe these rationales as compensatory and remedial.  It may be both 
accurate and helpful (and, for interested advocates, politically savvy) 
to represent science funding as a form of ad hoc compensation for a 
taking, doled out in lieu of intellectual property rights (transforming 
discoveries into public goods), and/or as a mechanism to diminish 
the distortions within science perpetuated by the patent system. 
Both rationales emerge from the unsteady relationship between 
legal and scientific institutions, a relationship mediated heavily by the 
patent system.  But they diverge—and this is what makes them poten-
tially complementary, rather than mutually exclusive—in addressing 
separate consequences of our intellectual property regime.  The com-
pensatory rationale addresses normative concerns:  the justice princi-
ples and rights claims long associated with takings jurisprudence.  We 
are concerned here with law treating individuals fairly.  The remedial 
rationale, in contrast, is responsive to economic realities.  It forces 
recognition of the structural, demographic, and financial distortions 
long foisted by the patent system upon the enterprise of science.  We 
are concerned here with acknowledging and potentially accounting 
for the long-term effects of attaching monopolies to some research 
products rather than others.  Alone, or in tandem, these rationales 
encourage a view of science funding as obligatory rather than discre-
tionary, as a duty rather than a luxury. 
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C.  Political Reconstruction of Basic Research 
1.  Overvaluing or Undervaluing? 
Once we envision public support for the sciences as a duty—to 
compensate individuals for appropriating property or to remedy dis-
tortions fostered by legal interventions—then the architects and 
would-be reformers of our intellectual property system must ask 
whether such funding, in scale or form, is sufficient compensation 
and what it even means to talk about sufficiency in the context of sci-
entific research. 
Let us begin with the second question first, for it is one that we 
have already addressed.  We could frame sufficiency in legal terms:  do 
we accord what the law requires?  In many respects, this inquiry 
formed the core of the first two sections of this Article.  I have argued 
that the lines drawn by patentable-subject-matter doctrine between ba-
sic and applied research are practically and theoretically unsatisfying, 
and for those reasons legally untenable. 
We might also talk about sufficiency in economic terms:  do we 
provide a level of public support for basic research commensurate in 
scale with our goals for innovation and progress in the sciences, par-
ticularly in light of the tremendously lucrative social support we ac-
cord patentable inventions?  This is ultimately a question for bona fide 
economists.  It is certainly possible that the current scale of public 
support for basic research—through grants and scholarships at re-
search institutes and public universities—is, in some sense, efficient 
(or maybe even overgenerous).  Put another way, it is at least feasible 
that these investments currently yield a level of innovation perfectly 
commensurate with our collective ambitions.181  But if we are talking 
181 The challenge here is to determine the shadow price of basic-research products 
ranging from groundbreaking discoveries to relatively incremental insights.  We do not 
know the true “market value” for these “commodities” because they are not traded in 
any discernable marketplace.  Determining the shadow price of discoveries—as a class 
or on a discovery-by-discovery basis—is likely to be an involved, complex exercise, one 
that would also invariably be ad hoc.  During more statist times of global politics, 
economists developed an academic industry to estimate shadow prices for commodities 
whose prices were controlled by the state.  Their inquiries would follow questions 
along the lines of, “What would have been the market price for waged labor in an 
economy where a minimum wage was imposed?”  Or, “what would have been the mar-
ket value of butter when the price of butter was controlled?”  See generally J. Peter 
Neary, Trade Liberalisation and Shadow Prices in the Presence of Tariffs and Quotas, 36 INT’L
ECON. REV. 531, 538-40 (1995) (modeling the shadow pricing of both “tariff-
2228 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 2175
in comparative terms, then it is hard to imagine that we are somehow 
overvaluing or overcompensating unpatentable basic research and 
discoveries, given the highly lucrative monopoly rents we uniquely at-
tach to patentable inventions and the hugely profitable industries that 
those rents have sustained. 
Practically speaking, our courts are unlikely to soon eschew centu-
ries of patent metaphysics by creating a property rights regime for 
products of basic research.  In turn, it may be difficult to imagine our 
legislature soon crafting a regime that could be practically applied 
and capable of addressing many of the concerns highlighted in 
Part III.182  But even if our legal and political institutions fail to meet 
these inertial and creative challenges, the consequences of law’s inter-
ventions upon science potentially represent powerful arguments for 
advocates of basic scientific research in debates over political priorities 
and budgetary policy. 
2.  Views of Basic Research 
A common trope of political conversation questions the judgment 
of political leaders who support continued or even increased invest-
ments in basic science before “resolving” ostensibly more pressing 
human needs.  This perspective construes feeding the poor and build-
ing superconducting supercolliders as somehow mutually exclusive.183
Though the hurdles to creating a scientific property regime are con-
siderable, the reasons for even suggesting such reforms represent 
powerful rejoinders to the presumption that public science funding is 
relatively extraneous or inessential. 
If basic research conjures a form of property that we have long 
failed to formally recognize or adequately compensate, then our legal 
and normative commitments may compel us to sustain or enhance 
public funding of scientific research as a form of ad hoc compensa-
tion.  Or if, in turn, the patent system distorts the distribution of sci-
entific talent and investment by attaching monopolies to some re-
search products but not others, then economic and social 
constrained” and “quota-constrained” goods); György Simon, Ex Post Examination of 
Macro-Economic Shadow Prices, ECON. PLANNING, Oct. 1965, at 80. 
182 As we have already observed, the problem of improvements is particularly sali-
ent, and it may become more acute as we sweep basic scientific insights into novel 
rights regimes.  We would need to craft doctrines and structures capable of ensuring 
that improvements and applications of basic research would not be stifled. 
183 For a classic discussion of this motif, see Harvey Brooks, The Practical Uses of Pure 
Research, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1970, at C78. 
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considerations suggest that we may want to redress that imbalance by 
making basic research relatively more lucrative, attractive, and feasible 
than it currently is.  Correcting this imbalance would diminish the in-
centive gap that the law now projects between research products in 
basic and applied science.  From this perspective, public support of 
science becomes a normative and economic mandate, rather than a 
matter of political expedience. 
Again, these rationales are not mutually exclusive.  They can, and 
should, all play a part in strengthening public commitments to science 
funding.  It is perfectly reasonable to argue for government support of 
basic research for reasons of social good or national pride, as well as 
for the sake of just compensation and market efficiency.  Only the first 
of these three categories (largesse/social investment), however, has 
regularly played a part in our national discourse on the matter.184
Arguing for scientific research as a form of social investment is a 
significant but relatively weak rationale, one that has frequently met 
its match on Capitol Hill and in other legislative chambers.  When we 
portray science funding as essentially voluntary, it becomes but one of 
many funding priorities, each of varying political, social, and eco-
nomic value.  When we choose to set science budgets, we are choosing to 
invest in research over other essentially voluntary, and often deeply 
compelling, projects—beefing up border security, for instance, or 
supplementing Head Start’s budget.  Given that the return on science 
investment is often hypothetical (we can hope but not reasonably 
predict whether that cure to cancer, or that vaccine for malaria, will 
ever be produced) and frequently esoteric, securing political support 
for research (let alone maintaining or expanding it) is generally a 
matter of legislative jockeying, highly sensitive to the whims of party 
politics. 
The discussion changes if science funding is not construed as 
merely voluntary but is seen instead as a matter of economic necessity 
(leveling distortions and encouraging market efficiency) or even of 
constitutional/justice principles (providing fair compensation for a 
governmental taking).  It is the difference between choosing to do 
something and being committed to it, between largesse and duty, be-
184 In the view of modern economics, the second and third approaches are interre-
lated, compensation being part and parcel of efficiency considerations.  That is, while 
questions of distortion are ultimately positive in nature—suggesting dilemmas of dis-
tribution and incentives best left to trained economists—questions of just compensa-
tion are basically normative, turning on how we choose to characterize and treat prop-
erty or even if we choose to call something property in the first place. 
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tween what is dispensable and what is obligatory.  Table 1 summarizes 
these varying perspectives. 
Table 1:  A Comparison of Rationales for Public Funding of 
“Basic” (Unpatentable) Scientific Research 
Largesse/
Social Investment 
Efficiency/
Market Distortions 
Compensation/
Takings
Government
Research
Grants
An uncertain and 
essentially op-
tional/voluntary
investment of pub-
lic moneys, made 
alternately for the 
sake of downstream 
economic effects, to 
trump foreign gov-
ernments in pres-
tige and intellectual 
capital, or to bring 
about a desired, if 
theoretical, good (a 
cure, vaccine, etc.) 
that is currently un-
available.
Remedial public 
moneys to subsidize 
an area of research 
undervalued by 
standing market 
conditions, condi-
tions which have 
been fundamentally 
shaped by the mo-
nopolies that gov-
ernment attaches to 
applied-research
products but cate-
gorically denies to 
products of basic 
research.
Prospective and ret-
rospective compen-
sation for a success-
ful researcher or 
lab group, in ex-
change for relin-
quishing property 
rights to the past 
and future products 
of the research be-
ing supported. 
Tenure
at State 
Universities
An investment in 
education, in which 
the research com-
ponent is tied to 
teaching obliga-
tions meant to train 
future generations 
of research scien-
tists; endows society 
with the pomp/ 
grandeur of an in-
ternationally
prominent domes-
tic academe.
The creation of a 
space for basic sci-
entific researchers 
to pursue their 
work, given the few 
opportunities to 
continue their re-
search in the pri-
vate sector outside 
of the private aca-
demic setting; a 
remedial measure 
to balance oppor-
tunities in the pub-
lic sector with those 
fostered in the pri-
vate sector by the 
patent system. 
The extension of 
job security for a 
public servant who, 
until this point, has 
been generating 
knowledge with pal-
try personal returns 
and at the expense 
of more lucrative 
alternative career 
paths; compensa-
tion, if not wholly 
fair compensation, 
for research find-
ings provided to the 
public.
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Largesse/
Social Investment 
Efficiency/
Market Distortions 
Compensation/
Takings
Basic
Innovation/
Discovery
An intermittent re-
turn on investment; 
filler for campaign 
speeches; cause for 
a press conference 
on slow news days; 
worthy of an occa-
sional medal. 
A relatively fortui-
tous event, which 
we may not only be 
underincentivizing,
but actually de-
pressing due to the 
monopoly rents 
available solely to 
innovations in ap-
plied science; less 
lucrative, by far, 
than innovations 
(real or imagined) 
that qualify for pat-
ent protection. 
Private scientific 
property that gov-
ernment has cho-
sen to make public 
by creating an ex-
ception to standing 
categories of pat-
entable subject mat-
ter; compensable 
like other forms of 
private property in 
the fashion of exist-
ing takings juris-
prudence.
D.  A Brief Review 
I have argued that patent law constitutes a long-standing interven-
tion upon the scientific enterprise.  Yet, centuries old, it has so deeply 
shaped the nature and development of science that to call it an “inter-
vention” is to gloss over its ubiquity.  Patent monopolies have almost 
certainly altered the landscape of scientific research.  Our intellectual 
property system is not a naturalistic default, but modern science 
would be something other than modern science without it.  In this 
sense, our patent system has become a framing assumption in discus-
sions about how science is done. 
This observation alone should encourage the legal academy to 
take a fresh, critical look at the ambit of patentable subject matter—
for the lines that we draw help define the terrain and trajectory of sci-
entific research.  If those lines are arbitrary or analytically tenuous, 
then our legalistic whims have force far beyond their justifiable influ-
ence.  In turn, the manner in which the patent system rewards applied 
research should color the ways in which we understand public support 
for basic research.  Such support, set against generous patent monopo-
lies, may be described as more than largesse or social investment, but 
also in terms of market correction (with reference to economic analy-
sis) and just compensation (with apologies to takings jurisprudence). 
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CONCLUSION
Law has long played the part of a polymath in our patent system:  
at once philosopher, sociologist, psychologist, and economist.  Per-
haps in an earlier era, law’s characterizations of science—how it func-
tions, its diversity of pursuits, its transformations over time, what it is 
capable of saying about the world—and those of professional re-
searchers, philosophers, engineers, and social scientists converged.  
But they do not today.  Patent law, at a variety of turns, hinges on 
questionable, idiosyncratic assumptions about the content and con-
tours of the scientific enterprise.  It clings to archaic metaphysical no-
tions of science that are largely unfamiliar to professional scientists; it 
projects impulses, norms, and mindsets upon researchers that, while 
stirring, strain credulity. 
Law’s characterizations would arguably be of no moment were 
they wholly theoretical, isolated from our patent system and incidental 
to science itself.  Yet, as we have seen, they may be profoundly signifi-
cant for students choosing graduate degrees, doctoral candidates 
choosing careers, scientists choosing research projects, universities 
choosing faculty members, industries choosing investments, admini-
strations choosing budgetary priorities, and so on.  The doctrines of 
patentable subject matter inexorably shape, and have long shaped, the 
legal and economic backdrop of entire fields of science and subjects 
of inquiry—those fields and subjects that make the cut, but also, criti-
cally, those that do not.  Even if we cast researchers as slavishly com-
mitted to high-minded norms (identified by lawyers), as wide-eyed 
idealists unsullied by base economic considerations, patent law’s dis-
tortions of the scientific enterprise remain worthy of attention. 
Our patent system is fundamentally an intervention upon science, 
rather than a reflection of some default in science.  I have suggested in 
this Article several normative, economic, and political implications of 
that intervention.  A distinction between basic and applied science 
chiseled into a marble museum rotunda may constitute little more 
than a platitude or afterthought.  Ossified into the institutions and ju-
risprudence of our patent system, however, it becomes quite conse-
quential indeed. 
